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Abstract: this thesis stresses the need for a reconceptualization of the judicial role in UK 
labour law. It will be argued that a purposive approach is the most appropriate approach for 
judges to take in this respect. Indeed, there has been an increasing willingness to use the 
purposive approach, using non-EU-derived legal sources, by the UK Supreme Court in labour 
law cases. It will be argued that a change in approach, as described, has the potential to 
redress the power imbalance in the employment relationship and mitigate the adverse effects 
of (increasingly likely) labour law deregulation on workers’ rights in a post-Brexit, post-
COVID-19 UK. Consequently, the thesis will build a model of purposive interpretation, as it 
progresses, with reference to the theories of Aharon Barak, Guy Davidov, Ronald Dworkin and 
labour law cases in the House of Lords and UK Supreme Court. The thesis will use this model 
to make a descriptive and normative assessment of how the UK Supreme Court should decide 
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I am a Solicitor, specialising in employment and discrimination law, having represented both 
employer and employee clients during my career. I was motivated to write this thesis for two 
main reasons. I have seen new methods of working take hold in the UK over the years, 
particularly the rise of the “gig” economy, and the damaging effect that such developments 
have had on workers’ rights. The power disparity in the employment relationship in this country 
seems to be getting stronger. I am also concerned that Brexit will lead to a reduction in EU-
derived labour rights in the UK labour market. Given that the EU has been an important source 
of progressive labour rights in the UK for several decades, Brexit poses a real threat to such 
rights. My concern is heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The toxic combination of Brexit 
and COVID-19 may provide a currently dominant Conservative Government, which has had 
labour law deregulation on its mind for some time, an ideological catalyst to reduce workers’ 
rights in the name of economic recovery. 
Given these developments, and the possibility of labour market deregulation, I believe that a 
reconceptualisation of the judicial role in UK labour law is required. A move away from the 
traditional literal approach to labour law interpretation is necessary. It should be replaced with 
a more flexible, dynamic approach to legal interpretation which will allow the judiciary to keep 
pace with rapidly changing patterns in the workforce and society. I believe that the purposive 
approach to labour law embodies these necessary qualities. The purposive approach can also 
be applied across a whole range of non-EU-derived legal sources, such as the common law, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and other international 
treaties to help ameliorate the power imbalance in the employment relationship and, should 
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Introduction 
UK labour law has been in a state of crisis for several decades.1 Rapid technological progress 
and globalisation have led to different styles of working during this time-period. Workers such 
as those on zero hours contracts, and those working in the “gig” economy, are increasingly 
atomised from their colleagues. As a result, these workers are often less likely to know about 
their employment rights, and their employers’ corresponding obligations towards them, than 
workers in a unionised workforce.2 To make matters worse, trade union representation has been 
on a steady decline in the UK since the 1980s and the Trade Union Act 2016 has further diluted 
the powers of trade unions.3 This damaging combination of socio-economic factors on UK 
labour law has been exacerbated by the fact that employers are using “armies of lawyers”4 to 
draft convoluted contractual documents whose purpose is to evade the employer’s obligations 
under the employment relationship.5 Our labour laws are not keeping pace with these changes.6  
Brexit – an escalation in the crisis? 
If UK labour law has been in a state of crisis for some time, this crisis looks like it may escalate.  
The UK is set to leave the European Union with effect from 31 December 2020. This carries 
the threat that the UK Government will impose deregulatory measures in the labour market by 
repealing, or regressively amending, EU-derived domestic legislation which protect workers’ 
rights. Greater deregulation of labour law in the UK has been on the Conservative 
Government’s agenda for some time.7 Opinion is split as to whether there will be a political 
appetite to reduce workers’ rights in a post-Brexit UK. The current Conservative Government 
owes many of its votes in the last General Election to former Labour voters. This factor 
militates against the possibility of an overhaul of workers’ rights. However, the situation is 
now complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK is currently experiencing an 
 
1 Davidov, G, Langille, B Understanding Labour Law; A Timeless Idea, a Timed-Out Idea, or an Idea whose Time 
has now Come? In Davidov, G, Langille, B, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press 2011) p.1.  
2 Davidov, G, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) p.228 
3 Ford, M, Novitz, T, Legislating for Control: The Trade Union Act 2016, I.L.J. 2016, 45(3), 277-298, at p.277. 
4 Per Elias L.J, Consistent Group Limited v Kalwak and others [2008] EWCA Civ 430, paragraphs 57 – 59. 
5 The term “employment relationship” is used in this Thesis as a broad term to describe an employer’s relationship 
with both employees and dependent contractors under section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 
Act”). Any reference to a “worker” in the study may refer to an employee (under section 230(3)(a) of the 1996 
Act as well as a dependent contractor under section 230(3)(b). If another piece of legislation referred to in this 
Thesis alludes to a “worker” and this meaning departs from the meaning of “worker” under section 230, this will 
be specified. The position of officeholders and other non-contract-based workers is also considered in this study 
and this will be specified where appropriate.  
6 Davidov, n.2, p.2. 
7 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Flexible, Effective, Fair: Promoting Economic Growth 
through a Strong and Effective Labour Market (2011) 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32148/11 -
1308-flexible-effective-fair-labour-market.pdf) 
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unprecedented socio-economic crisis. Given the damaging economic impact of the pandemic, 
which seems likely to continue for a prolonged period, it is suggested that economic recovery 
will be at the forefront of the Conservative Government’s agenda. This unique dynamic 
between Brexit and the COVID-19 crisis might present an ideal opportunity for a dominant 
Conservative Government to bring about some swift deregulatory measures to labour law as 
part of their overall economic recovery plan. 
This study takes the view that the measures, implemented by the Johnson Government, makes 
it likely that we shall see a reduction of workers’ rights through new legislation in a post-Brexit 
UK. Safeguards to workers’ rights were initially protected under the binding Withdrawal 
Agreement.8 However, the Johnson Government has managed to negotiate out of this. These 
provisions are now contained in the non-binding Political Declaration.9 The Government’s 
powers to repeal, and / or amend, EU-derived labour laws are contained in the European Union 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (“2020 Act”). Under sections 2 – 4 of the 2020 Act, a body 
of retained EU law will remain in place after the current transition period ends (on 31 December 
2020). Any UK legislation passed on or after 31 December 2020 will take precedence over EU 
law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) loses all jurisdiction over British 
tribunals and courts from that date and any future decisions of that court will not bind domestic 
courts and tribunals. In addition, under section 6 of the 2020 Act, the UK Supreme Court, and 
the appellate section of the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland, will not be bound by any EU 
law that remains in place on or after 31 December 2020. There is also scope, under section 6 
of the 2020 Act, for the Government to make Regulations to extend this exemption to lower 
courts and tribunals. In short, the Johnson Government will have a vast array of legal powers 
to repeal, or regressively amend, EU-derived employment rights in a post-Brexit UK. 
The threat posed by Brexit to UK labour law is a serious one. The EU has strengthened 
employment rights in the UK through several of its key institutional mechanisms. As Ford has 
highlighted, a considerable number of our labour rights derive from the EU, including 
protection against discrimination on the grounds of sex, pregnancy, race, disability, religion 
and belief, age and sexual orientation and the right to equal pay between men and women.10 
The EU has also provided a wide range of health and safety protections for pregnant women, 
 
8 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European 
Union and the European Atomic Energy Committee, endorsed by a Special Meeting of the European Council on 
25 November 2018. 
9 Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and 
United Kingdom (2019 / C384 I/02). 
10 Ford, M, The impact of Brexit on UK labour law, (2016) International Journal of Comparative Law, 32(4), 
473 – 96, at p.476.  
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as well as rights to maternity and parental leave. In addition, fixed-term, part-time and agency 
workers have obtained stronger levels of protection from EU law.11 Ford has also identified 
how the EU has introduced equivalent terms and conditions, and protections against unfair 
dismissal, on the transfer of an undertaking, into domestic law, as well as enhancing general 
health and safety standards at work.12 Moreover, the right to a written statement of terms and 
conditions of employment and most of our laws regarding working time limits derive from the 
EU.13 
This list of EU-derived rights is not exhaustive. However, it demonstrates the wide breadth, 
and scope, of the labour rights which the UK has acquired as a result of EU membership. Most 
of these rights are potentially at risk of dilution or repeal in a post-Brexit UK. Furthermore, 
under the 2020 Act, UK courts will no longer be able to make references to the CJEU on points 
of law. The ability to make such references has proved a source of progressive labour reforms 
in the past. As Grogan has illustrated,14 past decisions of the CJEU removed compensation 
caps on discrimination claims,15 extended the scope of anti-discrimination laws to protect 
transsexual people16 and developed the existing discrimination jurisprudence to include 
discrimination by association.17 In addition to these institutional mechanisms of protection, the 
EU principle of effectiveness18 has proven to be a more general, yet effective, constraint on 
Government’s ability to deregulate labour laws which derive from the EU.19 The Government 
will be free to disregard this principle in a post-Brexit UK. 
Given the importance of EU law to the UK’s system of labour laws, the seriousness of the 
threat of post-Brexit deregulation of EU-derived labour rights should not be underestimated. 
Given this level of seriousness, the critical question for labour lawyers and scholars is: can the 
threat be mitigated using legal mechanisms?  
Reconceptualising the judicial approach to labour law 
The answer to the question set is a both a cautious and a qualified “yes.” The next question is 
how this can be achieved. Given the current political climate, it is unrealistic to expect that 
 
11 Ibid, p.476 
12 Ibid, p.476 
13 Ibid, p.476. 
14 Grogan, J, Rights and remedies at risk: implications of the Brexit process on the future of rights in the UK 
2019, P.L. Oct, 683 – 702, p.688 
15 Marshall v Southhampton and South West Hampshire AHA (No.2) (C-271 / 91) EU:C: 1993:335; [1994] Q.B. 
126. 
16 P v S and Cornwall County Council (C13/94) EU:C: 1996:170; 1996 E.C.R. I -2143.  
17 Coleman v Attridge Law (C-303/06) EU:C: 2008:415; [2008] E.C.R. I-5603  
18 Treaty on European Union 2012/C 326/01, Article 19. 
19 Ford, n.10, p.480. 
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progressive legislation will be forthcoming any time soon. A reconceptualization of the judicial 
role in labour law disputes is therefore a better focal point for addressing the main challenges, 
and goals, within contemporary UK labour law. Given the rapid changes in working methods, 
which are constantly evolving in tandem with technological growth, coupled with employer’s 
evasive tactics, a flexible and dynamic mode of judicial interpretation is required. This mode 
of reasoning must also be one which is congruent with the specific goals, and needs, of modern 
labour law. Given these fundamental requirements, this thesis advocates a purposive  
interpretative approach to labour law cases. The recommended purposive model of 
interpretation will be defined in greater detail, and then developed throughout the course of the 
thesis. For now, a very basic definition will suffice: the purposive approach to judicial 
interpretation focuses the judge’s mind on the purpose of the law being interpreted. The 
primary building blocks of the purposive model of interpretation being advocated will be 
forged from an articulation of the main goals of labour law, focusing on the writing of Kahn-
Freund, a review of UK labour law cases in the House of Lords and, latterly, the UK Supreme 
Court, which adopted a purposive method20 and an analysis of labour law and jurisprudential 
scholarship; primarily the theories of Aharon Barak, Guy Davidov and Ronald Dworkin. 
Consequently, the principal aim of this thesis is to build a purposive mode of judicial 
interpretation that can be applied to labour law disputes. It does not focus on other areas of the 
law. Indeed, judicial modes of reasoning will be based on different background presumptions 
and requirements depending on the area of law being adjudicated. These presumptions, and 
requirements, are necessary for the set of laws to achieve their purposes. For instance, in 
criminal law, the judicial mode of reasoning must view the circumstances of the case, and the 
application of the law to those circumstances, with the presumption of innocence at the 
forefront of the judge’s mind. In addition, the judge must be acutely aware of various evidential 
rules and the requirement that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. These specific 
presumptions and requirements (and many others) are necessary in the criminal law context for 
the law to achieve its purposes. However, the judge will not apply the same presumptions and 
requirements when adjudicating a commercial law dispute. She will adopt a different set of 
presumptions and requirements. So, the most appropriate mode of judicial reasoning for a 
certain area of the law must contextualise the fundamental presumptions, and requirements, 
relative to the area of law being adjudicated. A central point made by this thesis is that judges 
should not generally be adopting the same mode of reasoning in labour law cases that they 
 
20 This thesis will be restricted to labour law cases in one judicial forum - the House of Lords and the UK Supreme 
Court. Cases in lower courts and tribunals, and those involving references to the CJEU, are not included.  
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would apply in general commercial law cases. The distinction, and the reasons for it, will be 
explained in the analysis of Autoclenz Limited v. Belcher (Autoclenz)21 in Chapter 2. 
It will therefore be necessary, throughout the course of this thesis, to build presumptions and 
background requirements on to the purposive model of interpretation that is being advocated. 
Indeed, the purposive mode of judicial reasoning that this thesis seeks to build is tailored to 
labour law’s specific goals and requirements. This raises a key question, addressed in Chapter 
1 of the thesis: what are those goals and requirements?  
 
Summary of thesis 
 
Chapter 1 analyses the main policy goals of labour law. There will also be a review, and critical 
analysis, of the House of Lords’ historical approach to labour law cases, which evidences a 
judicial willingness to adopt a purposive method of legal interpretation. Chapter 2 reviews the 
existing literature on the purposive approach to law in general, and labour law, focusing 
primarily on the theories of Davidov and Barak. The purposive approach is both defended from 
its critics and normatively justified. Ronald Dworkin’s theory of ad judication, specifically his 
emphasis on the use of legal principles by the judiciary, is also reviewed in Chapter 2 to help 
build the model of purposive interpretation advocated in this thesis.  
In Chapter 3, the model will be developed, and shown in its practical application, by reference 
to labour law judgements in the UK Supreme Court. These judgements show that the judicial 
approach to purposive interpretation in UK labour law is gathering pace. They also demonstrate 
how a purposive approach, using sources of law which are not derived from the EU, can assist  
judges in the determination of hard legal cases whilst also conferring broader systemic benefits 
to labour law. In relation to the latter, it will be shown how the purposive approach adopted by 
the UK Supreme Court has helped to ameliorate the power imbalance in the employment 
relationship. This, it will be argued, is of fundamental relevance when assessing the judiciary’s 
potential capacity to mitigate the adverse effects of Brexit.  
In Chapter 4, the purposive model will be applied to the pending Supreme Court decision in 
Uber v Aslam.22 It will show how the components of the purposive model that have been built 
 
21 [2011] UKSC 41. 
22 [2018] EWCA Civ 2748 
   
 
 13  
 
can be applied to this specific case in order to secure a favourable outcome for vulnerable 
workers. Chapter 5 will conclude. 
 
Chapter 1 – A purposive approach to UK labour law 
 
1.1 The goals of labour law 
Otto Kahn-Freund is widely regarded as the “founding father” of UK labour law.23  
For Kahn-Freund there were two “universal truths”24 to labour law. The first was that there was 
an inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee.25 The other flowed from 
an innate conflict in the employment relationship.26 As Dukes has observed, Kahn-Freund 
believed that freedom of contract, in the labour law context, was a “sham” due to the power 
disparity in the employment relationship.27 Consequently, Kahn-Freund believed that the 
primary goal of labour law has always been, and always will be, to redress the inequality of 
bargaining power in the employment relationship.28 Kahn-Freund also saw the need to re-assert 
the worker’s dignity as part of redressing the power disparity in the employment relationship.29 
The primary way of achieving these goals was through the adoption of  collective bargaining 
and industrial action, which he advocated in his model of collective laissez-faire.30  
Consequently, the most prominent foundational writer in UK labour law saw the primary goals 
of labour law as the reduction in the power disparity in the employment relationship and the 
resultant reassertion of the worker’s dignity through a process of collective bargaining. 
However, collective bargaining has been in consistent decline in the UK since the 1980s. 
Whilst a widespread return to it would be welcomed by many labour lawyers and academics, 
this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, other ways of redressing 
 
23  Vranken, M, Autonomy and Individual Labour Law: a Comparative Analysis, (1989) International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 5(2) 100. 
24 Dukes, R, Constitutionalising Employment Relations: Sinzheimer, Kahn-Freud and the Role of Labour Law, 
Journal of Law and Society, Sep 2008, Vol 35 No 3, pp341 – 63, at p.352. 
25 Ibid, p.352 
26 Ibid, p.353 
27 Dukes, R, Otto Kahn-Freund and Collective Laissez-Faire: An Edifice without a Keystone? (2009) 72(2) 
MLR 220 – 46, at p.221. 
28 Kahn-Freund, O, Arbeit und Recht, (Bund Verlag, 1979) 7. (Referenced from Weiss, M, Re-inventing Labour 
Law? in Davidov, Langille, (ed.) n.1, p.50) 
29 Dukes, n.24, p.363 
30 Ibid, p.363. 
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the power imbalance will have to be found. This is where the purposive approach to labour law 
becomes relevant. 
Before moving on to an analysis of the purposive approach, it is necessary to establish whether 
there actually is an inherent inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship. 
This thesis takes the view that there is such inequality and that it has been created by the law. 
The employment relationship is a legal construct. Using capitalist legal concepts such as 
freedom of contract and private property, the law created the employment relationship. These 
private law rules of contract and property, by their nature, favour the employer’s interests. 
Indeed, as Davidov notes, the “free market” inevitably “creates an unfair default in favour of 
employers because the market is based on private laws of contract, property and corporations 
which are heavily weighted in favour of the employer.31  
There is a great deal of merit in Davidov’s claim. Freedom of contract is typically an artificial 
construct in labour law.32 The “freedom” weighs heavily in favour of the employer.33 The 
employer generally has access to greater collective financial and technical resources than each 
individual employee. This means that employers can instruct legal advisers to draft convoluted 
contractual documents to evade their legal responsibilities towards their workers. As was the 
case in Autoclenz, if the worker wishes to work, she must generally accept these terms as they 
stand.34 The differential in financial and technical resources also results in a situation where 
employers typically own, or at least control, the property within which the workers operate, 
and the materials they require to perform work-related tasks. In addition, corporate law often 
restricts the liabilities of businesses and transfers the risk to workers.35 These factors combine 
to create a power imbalance in the employment relationship. This imbalance is then 
strengthened even further by the employer’s power to dismiss the worker. Indeed, the ever-
present possibility of dismissal by the employer is perhaps the most prominent example of the 
power disparity in the employment relationship.   
Consequently, the employment relationship is, in essence, a continuous cycle of power 
imbalance and worker subordination. The legal system, which supports the capitalist model, 
created the unfair power default in favour of employers. This default is exploited by the 
employer to impose terms and conditions of employment on the worker which typically favour 
the employer’s interests. The contractual framework then allows the employer a significant  
 
31  Davidov, n.2, p.21 
32 See n.27. 
33 Langille, B, Labour Law’s Theory of Justice (Davidov, Langille, n.1, p.101). 
34 Autoclenz, paragraph 11 
35 Davidov, n.2, p.21. 
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level of control over the worker. This leads to the second form of subordination where a 
relationship of dependency, reinforced by the worker’s vulnerability, can thereby flourish.  
As a result, this thesis proceeds on the basis that there is an inequality of bargaining power in 
the employment relationship, which reinforces the power imbalance between employers and 
workers, and that the primary goal of labour law is to redress that imbalance and thereby restore 
the dignity of the worker. (Moreover, as the case analyses will show, even in some situations 
out with the employment relationship, individuals engaged in work, such as officeholders, 
which is not strongly associated with a power imbalance, can find themselves in highly 
vulnerable situations in the workplace.36)     
It has been argued that the traditional paradigmatic goal of labour law, to redress the inequality 
in bargaining power, is not the most appropriate paradigm for modern labour law.37 Indeed, 
scholars such as Langille question the relevance of this task to modern labour law, asking the 
question why it is important to care about it.38 Other scholars, such as Kountouris and 
Freedland, support the traditional paradigmatic goal in principle but argue that changing 
conditions in the workforce have rendered the paradigm outdated.39 
By contrast, this thesis holds true to the traditional paradigm. As noted above, the inequality of 
bargaining power is inextricably linked to a cycle of subordination. The worker’s subordination 
arises from the capitalist constructs of the legal system, which create a power default in favour 
of the employer, and this results in an inequality of bargaining power which then, in turn, 
increases the worker’s subordination to form a continuous cycle of subordination and 
dependence. As Dukes has noted, Kahn-Freund was not solely concerned with inequality of 
bargaining power, as Langille appears to believe, but he “understood inequality of bargaining 
power as but one expression or particular manifestation of the deeper-seated problem of the 
subordination of the worker to the employer, labour to management. His concern was not only 
with contractual bargaining power, in other words, but with “social power” more broadly 
conceived.”40 Dukes’ observation is supported by Kahn-Freund's reliance on more general 
concepts of power, subordination and submission when he comments on the need to redress 
the inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship: 
 
36 Gilham v. Ministry of Justice (Gilham) [2019] UKSC 44, paragraph 7. 
37 Langille, B, Labour Law’s Theory of Justice, (Davidov, Langille, n1, p.116). 
38 Ibid, p.116. 
39 Dukes, R, The Labour Constitution (Oxford University Press 2014) Kindle edition - loc 7285. 
40 Ibid, loc 7294 
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“But the relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. In its inception it is 
an act of submission, in its operation it is a condition of subordination however much the 
submission and the subordination may be concealed by that indispensable figment of the legal 
mind known as the “contract of employment.” The main object of labour law has always been, 
and we venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality 
of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship.”41 
Consequently, Kahn-Freund's paradigm is broader than Langille conceives. This is relevant in 
the present context. The continuous cycle of subordination, as described in this thesis, reflects 
Kahn-Freund's view that inequality of bargaining power was part of a larger problem relating 
to worker subordination. As will be shown, this broader concern of worker subordination is 
even more relevant today than it was when Kahn-Freund wrote about it. Given Kahn Freund’s 
broader concerns with worker subordination, and its continuing relevance to modern working 
practices, this thesis agrees with Dukes’ position that these broader aspects of Kahn-Freund's 
theory make it more difficult to dismiss his paradigm as outdated.42  
Instead, the changing nature of the workforce reinforces the continued relevance of Kahn-
Freund’s paradigm. Globalisation and technological progress, together with a large range of 
other socio-economic factors, have changed methods of working. That much is true. However, 
these methods of working are still based on the same capitalist model as existed during Kahn-
Freund’s era.43 Moreover, this system has generated new methods of working, such as “gig" 
and zero hours contracts, which have generally greater degrees of inequality and subordination 
than the traditional employee with union representation. These modern workers are therefore 
generally more prone to exploitation and abuse than the traditional employee with union 
representation. Consequently, as Weiss notes, the increasing vulnerabilities of these workers 
does not require a shift in the labour law paradigm.44 Instead, they reinforce its importance – 
redressing the power imbalance in the employment relationship, and reasserting the dignity of 
the worker, is even more important today than it was several decades ago.  
Nevertheless, another objection to the traditional paradigm might be that the efficiency of 
markets should be the primary purpose of labour law. This argument rests on the contention 
that markets should be allowed to develop freely, without unnecessary restrictions, the labour 
 
41 Quoted from McColgan, A, Collins, H, Ewing, KD, Labour Law (Cambridge University Press, 2019), p.138 
42 Dukes, n.39, loc 7303 
43 Ibid, loc 7188. 
44 Weiss, M, Re-Inventing Labour Law, (Davidov, Langille, n.1 p.46). 
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market being no exception.45 The point often made by free market theorists is that, if employers 
can operate their businesses without restrictions, they will be able to compete in a highly 
globalised economy.46 However, it is suggested that the free-market model does not sit well 
with the unique nature of the labour market. Markets, in general, deal with the flow of 
commercial commodities. There may be some merit in the claim that these commercial markets 
should be left unregulated; this thesis does not attempt to dismantle the free market theory in 
general. Instead, it stresses that such theories are unsuitable to the labour market because 
human beings are not commercial commodities. As human beings, they have inherent dignity 
and are entitled to equal treatment. This necessitates a market which must be regulated. The 
purpose of such regulation must therefore be to ensure that the power imbalance in the 
employment relationship is redressed with a view to preventing exploitation of that power, and 
to thereby protect human dignity. 
Given the attraction of the traditional paradigm, it is unsurprising that many prominent modern 
labour law scholars continue to see the redress of inequality of bargaining power, and  reducing 
the power disparity, in the employment relationship as being a central goal of UK labour law.47 
Indeed, Collins has argued that inequality of bargaining power requires a judicial approach to 
labour law disputes which departs from the general principles of contractual interpretation.48 
This view is echoed by Bogg, who argues that the Autoclenz decision, which rested on the 
inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship, necessitates a new approach to 
labour law which is distinguishable from the general contractual approach. In addition, Brodie 
sees the power imbalance in the employment relationship as the “central feature in the 
employment contract”49 
Moreover, the need to redress the inequality of bargaining power in the employment 
relationship is also being increasingly recognised in the UK Supreme Court’s approach to 
labour law cases, such as Autoclenz, Unison and Hounga v Allen.50 These cases will be analysed 
in Chapter 3. In the meantime, the thesis will proceed on the basis that the judge, in her 
interpretative task, must adopt a mode of reasoning which has the inequality of bargaining 
power, together with its result, the worker’s subordination and vulnerability; and the 
consequent need to re-assert the worker’s dignity, at the forefront of her mind. These are the 
 
45 Davies, ACL, Perspectives on Labour Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.27  
46 Ibid, p.27 
47 For a review, see Pitt, Crisis or Stasis in the Contract of Employment?  (2013) 12(2) CIL 193 – 206, p.193. 
48 Ibid, p.193 
49 Ibid, p.193 
50 [2014] UKSC 47. 
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first building blocks of the purposive approach to judicial interpretation which is advocated in 
this thesis.     
Of course, a move to a purposive approach relies on a judicial willingness to do so. It could be 
argued that such a move is highly unlikely given the House of Lords’ historical bias in favour 
of employers in labour law cases.51 However, this thesis takes the view that there is evidence, 
from relatively early labour law decisions of the House of Lords through to very recent 
Supreme Court decisions, which demonstrates a willingness by the senior judiciary to embrace 
the purposive approach to UK labour law. To demonstrate this, a review of the earlier House 
of Lords’ approach to labour law cases will be carried out before the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is considered. 
1.2 Labour law decisions in the House of Lords 
In the field of labour law, one of the most prominent critics of the English judiciary was Lord 
Wedderburn.52 He saw the judiciary as possessing a class bias which favoured employers’ 
interests over the interests of trade unions and employees.53 Wedderburn saw this class bias as 
inevitable because these middle-to-upper class "judges are men, and like other men their 
decisions are influenced by the social background they have known and the unconscious 
premises they acquire.”54 For Wedderburn, labour law cases were infused with a political 
dimension, involving an unavoidable conflict between the interests of labour and capital, and 
the class bias of the judiciary favoured the interests of capital. In addition, Wedderburn took 
the position that the ordinary courts were inadequately equipped to deal with labour law 
disputes. Indeed, he believed that the only potentially appropriate legal forum to adjudicate 
such disputes would be specialised industrial courts,55 As a result, Wedderburn was keen to 
keep the ordinary courts out of labour law disputes, instead favouring a voluntarist approach.56  
Wedderburn’s insights on a pro-employer bias are reflected by the findings of Honeyball’s 
statistical review of all labour law cases decided by the House of Lords between May 1997 and 
June 2004.57 Honeyball’s study found that “there was a far higher likelihood of success for 
 
51 See Honeyball, S, Employment Law and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (2005) C.J.Q. 24(Jul), 
364 – 87. Davies, A.C.L, Judicial self-restraint in Labour Law 2009 I.L.J, 38(3), 278 – 305. 
52 Bogg, A, The hero’s journey: Lord Wedderburn and the “political constitution” of labour law, 2015, I.L.J, 
44(3), 299 – 348, at pp.304 - 5. 
53 Ibid, p.313 
54 Wedderburn, K.M. The Worker and the Law 1st edition (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1965) p.21 (quoted from 
Bogg, ibid, p.313). 
55 Dukes R, Wedderburn and the theory of labour law: building on Kahn-Freund 2015 ILJ 44(3), 357 – 84, at 
p.382. 
56 Ibid, p.364. 
57 Honeyball, n.51. 
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employers than for employees, with employees succeeding in just 11 cases whereas employers 
succeeded in 21.”58 
Honeyball’s findings have, in turn, been supported by Davies’ study of the British judicial 
approach to labour law disputes.59 Davies stresses that the senior judiciary has shown a 
historical “deference” to employers in labour law cases.60 She refers to the House of Lords’ 
decisions in Associated Newspapers v Wilson,61 Rainey v Greater Glasgow Health Board62 
and Barry v Midland Bank plc63 to exemplify this difference.64  
This thesis agrees with Davies’ analysis that the House of Lords decisions she cites demonstrate 
examples of a deference towards employers in labour law cases. However, her study fails to 
recognise another line of cases, running contemporaneously with the authorities she cites, 
which shows a judicial willingness, on the part of the House of Lords, to adopt a purposive 
approach to interpretation in labour law disputes, and which runs counter to presumptions of 
judicial deference towards employers. This line of case-law, Pickstone v Freemans,65 Litster v 
Forth Dry Dock Engineering Company Limited66 and Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group plc.67 
will now be analysed. 
Pickstone 
In Pickstone, which was an equal pay case, Mrs Pickstone, the respondent, was employed by 
the appellant as a “warehouse operative” and claimed that her work was of equal value to a 
male comparator who was employed at the same place of business as a “checker warehouse 
operative” and who was paid £4.22 per week more than the respondent.68 The appellant’s 
defence was that there was one man (not the comparator) doing the exact same job as the 
respondent at the same place of business and at an identical rate of pay.69 On a literal 
interpretation of the relevant equal pay legislation, the employer had a valid defence: there was 
one man doing the same job as Mrs Pickstone. Nevertheless, the House of Lords ruled in favour 
 
58 Ibid, p.367 
59 Davies, n.51. 
60 Ibid, pp.287 - 8. 
61 [1995] 2 AC 454 (Davies, ibid, p287) 
62 [1987] AC 224 (Davies, ibid, pp.301 - 2). 
63 [1999] 1 WLR 1465 (Davies, ibid, p.301). 
64 Davies, n.51, p.304. 
65 [1989] AC 66 
66 [1990] 1 A.C. 546. 
67 [2003] UKHL 33 
68 N.65, p.111. 
69 Ibid, p.111. 
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of Mrs Pickstone.70 In its ruling, the court read additional wording into the equal pay 
legislation.71 
In Pickstone, the majority arrived at their decision via the use of purposive interpretation. Lord 
Keith expressed concern that a literal interpretation of the relevant equal pay legislation would 
not only mean that Mrs Pickstone’s claim would fail, but that a literal interpretation would 
“...leave a large gap in the equal work provision, enabling an employer to evade it by employing 
one token man on the same work as a group of potential women claimants who were 
deliberately paid less than a group of men employed on work of equal value with that of the 
women.”72 
In addition, Lord Templeman, who gave the leading speech, scrutinised Hansard and the 
relevant Government Minister’s speech in the House of Commons to ascertain the purpose of 
the relevant equal pay legislation.73 This was an unprecedented step for a Law Lord to take at 
the time as Pickstone pre-dates Pepper v Hart.74 Lord Templeman took this novel measure to 
highlight the purpose of the equal pay legislation, as expressed by Parliament in debate. He 
also justifies the “purposive interpretation” by stating that it is in accordance with European 
Community law.75 
So, in Pickstone, the House of Lords adopted a purposive mode of interpretation to find in 
favour of the employee whilst fulfilling the systemic purpose of the equal pay provisions by 
plugging a lacuna in the legislation. 
Litster 
In Litster, a company, Forth Dry Dock, went into receivership in September 1983.76 On 
February 6, 1984 the company and its receivers entered into an agreement with another 
company, Forth Estuary, for the transfer to Forth Estuary of certain business interests of Forth 
Dry Dock with effect from Forth Dry Dock's close of business that day at 4.30 p.m.77 Later the 
same day, at about 3.30 p.m., the receivers dismissed the workforce of the company.78 Several 
of the employees claimed unfair dismissal. The basis of this claim was that the employees 
 
70 Ibid, pp.66-7. 
71 Ibid, pp,66-7. 
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should have transferred over to the employment of Forth Estuary under the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 (“TUPE 1981”).79 
The statutory provision which was under dispute in this case was Regulation 5(3) of TUPE 
1981 which stated: 
"Any reference in paragraph (1) . . . above to a person employed in an undertaking or part of 
one transferred by a relevant transfer is a reference to a person so employed immediately before 
the transfer, including, where the transfer is effected by a series of two or more transactions, a 
person so employed immediately before any of those transactions." 
The employer’s argument before the Law Lords was that, since the dismissals took place one 
hour before the transfer, the dismissed employees were not “employed immediately before the 
transfer” and so Regulation 5(1) did not transfer any liability from the old owner to the new 
owner.80 
The difficulty for the Law Lords was that a literal interpretation of Regulation 5(3) would allow 
the old owners (who were, and often are, insolvent) and new owners to agree that the old 
owners should dismiss its employees a short time before the transfer took place so that  they 
would not be “employed immediately before the transfer” under section 5(3). In this way, the 
new owner would have no liability towards the employees. In addition, the employees would 
not have a realisable remedy for unfair dismissal against the old owners. In effect, one of the 
main purposes of TUPE 1981, to protect the employees’ rights, and jobs, when a transfer took 
place, could be completely evaded by a simple act of collusion between the old and new 
employer. 
The House of Lords was not prepared to let the employer evade its obligations under TUPE 
1981. All the Law Lords agreed that it was necessary for the United Kingdom to interpret 
national law in conformity with (TUPE) European Council Directive (77 / 187 / EEC) dated 
14 February 1977.81 Again, on this occasion, they were unwilling to accept a literal 
interpretation of Regulation 5(3) as it would allow employers to evade their obligations under 
TUPE 1981. Accordingly, they read additional wording into Regulation 5(3) to allow the 
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employee’s claims to succeed and to close the “loophole” in the TUPE protections, thereby 
allowing them to fulfil their purpose.82 
So, similar considerations are at play in Litster and Pickstone: a purposive method of 
interpretation was adopted to reach findings in favour of the employees, to ensure that 
unscrupulous employers could not evade their labour law obligations, and to ensure that the 
purpose of the legislation was met. 
 
Rhys-Harper 
In this conjoined series of test cases, the principal question before the House of Lords was 
whether discriminatory acts done by an employer after the termination of employment fell 
within the scope of anti-discrimination legislation.83 Despite the absence of any reference to 
“former employees” in the anti-discrimination legislation under consideration, the court 
adopted a purposive approach to statutory interpretation and held that former employees were 
protected by the legislation if there were incidences of the employment relationship which still 
had to be dealt with after the employment had terminated.84 The analysis will focus on the 
Rhys-Harper case for the sake of brevity and because this was the lead case in the conjoined 
action. 
In this case Ms Rhys-Harper, the appellant, complained about her employer’s failure to conduct 
a proper investigation into a sexual harassment complaint she had made against a former 
employee.85 This complaint was made after her employment had terminated.86 Ms Rhys-Harper 
had been dismissed for gross misconduct and she appealed against this decision using her 
employer’s internal process.87 During her appeal, the appellant claimed that a former colleague, 
Mr Osborn, had sexually harassed her during her employment.88 On 30 November 1998, the 
company informed the appellant that her appeal was unsuccessful.89 She was also informed 
that the employer had investigated her sexual harassment claim and there was insufficient 
evidence against Mr Osborn.90 
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90 Ibid, paragraph 3. 
   
 
 23  
 
Ms Rhys-Harper lodged Employment Tribunal claims for unfair dismissal and discrimination  
which occurred after her employment had terminated.91 The question of whether discrimination 
claims under the relevant legislation could be brought after the termination of employment 
went to the House of Lords. 
The relevant legislation in this case was section 6(2) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which 
states: 
“It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an establishment in 
Great Britain, to discriminate against her:  
(a)  in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training, or to 
any other benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford her 
access to them, or  
(b)  by dismissing her or subjecting her to any other detriment” (my emphasis). 
The difficulty for the judges was that the plain meaning of the wording “employed by him” did 
not, on a literal construction, extend to former employees. As a result, the literal interpretation 
of this phrase clearly excludes former employees from the scope of the anti-discrimination 
provisions. This created difficulties for the House of Lords because the Law Lords recognised 
that, to exclude former employees from protection leads to unjust, and at times absurd, 
consequences.92 In addition, Lord Nicholls, who gave the leading speech, noted that, in 
Adeyeke v Post Office93 the Court of Appeal held that a claim for race discrimination could not 
succeed because the alleged act of discrimination took place after the employee had been 
dismissed.94 However, he went on to state that the “Adeyeke interpretation is insufficiently 
purposive. It pays insufficient heed to the context.”95 Lord Nicholls also observed that, in the 
sex discrimination case of Coote v Granada Hospitality96 the CJEU held that a former 
employee could bring a victimisation claim in relation to alleged post-termination acts of 
discrimination because the “employment relationship” extended beyond the duration of the 
contract of employment.97 
 
91 Ibid, paragraph 4. 
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Consequently, Lord Nicholls then goes on to adopt a more purposive construction – the 
“employment relationship” – which is broader, in temporal terms and in scope, than the 
contract of employment itself, and which he derives from the Coote case. As a result, Lord 
Nicholls goes on to allow Mrs Rhys-Harper's sex discrimination appeal because the 
circumstances of it arise from the employment relationship.  
So, in Rhys-Harper, we see another example of the House of Lords adopting a purposive 
interpretative method to find in favour of the employee whilst ensuring that the purpose of the 
relevant sex discrimination provisions was properly fulfilled. The purpose of the provisions, to 
combat discrimination, meant that it was necessary to extend anti-discrimination protections to 
former employees. 
1.3 Overview of the House of Lords’ literature - the existing literature does create a vivid 
picture of a House of Lords which has a pro-employer bias. The 3 House of Lords cases referred 
to by Davies, cited at section 1.2, do create the impression of a judicial deference to the interests 
of employers. Nevertheless, the analysis of the 3 cases above provides a counterbalance to the 
findings in Davies’ study. Indeed, the Law Lords did not take a deferential attitude towards the 
employers’ interests in Litster, Pickstone or Rhys-Harper. Instead, they went to great 
interpretative lengths in these 3 cases, adopting a highly purposive approach in each, to ensure 
that the employees’ claims were not frustrated  by an unduly literal interpretation of the relevant  
statutory provisions.  
Litster, Pickstone and Rhys-Harper also demonstrate a willingness on the part of the Law Lords 
to depart from a deferential attitude towards employers' interests when systemic considerations 
and compliance with EU law was at stake. Indeed, cases such as Litster have led Ford to the 
recent conclusion that, in labour law cases, “...the UK courts have been perfectly prepared to 
go far beyond the “ordinary” meaning of domestic legislation and to “read in” additional words 
to ensure that it achieves the result required by the relevant Directive...a radical domestic 
approach to interpretation has thus largely overcome the domestic court’s initial unfamiliarity 
with social rights, and plugged any gaps exposed by the government’s policy of minimalist  
implementation”98  
Ford’s analysis is accurate. The purposive approach to interpretation gave the Law Lords, in 
the cases analysed above, a much greater degree of flexibility, and judicial leeway, than the 
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strict literal tradition allows. This need for flexibility needs to be built into the purposive 
approach as it allows the courts to keep pace with the rapidly changing nature of labour law. 
Given that the House of Lords adopted a purposive approach in the Pickstone, Litster and Rhys-
Harper cases to ensure that domestic law complied with EU law, this could lead to the 
argument that, in a post-Brexit UK, the Supreme Court will see no need to continue with a 
purposive approach to interpretation. However, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, such an 
argument lacks strong foundations. Since the Supreme Court’s inception, the purposive 
approach has gained further pace in its labour law decisions. The thesis will analyse this line 
of Supreme Court cases and, in so doing, it will be shown that none of the cases involved a 
direct application of EU law. Instead, the line of cases analysed in Chapter 3 show an increased 
willingness by the UK Supreme Court to adopt a purposive mode of interpretation to a broad 
range of legal sources, including the common law, the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and other international treaties.  
 
Chapter 2 – Building a purposive approach to UK labour law 
 
2.1 Historical roots of the purposive approach 
The traditional interpretative method adopted by the judiciary, particularly in relation to 
statutory interpretation, has been to ascertain the plain meaning of the words.99 This is also 
known as the literal rule of judicial interpretation.100 Nevertheless, the roots of the purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation can be traced back several centuries to Heydon’s case.101 
This early decision established the “mischief rule” in cases of statutory interpretation.102 In 
essence, the rule requires the judge to identify the mischief which the statutory provision under 
consideration was designed to cure. The judge should then interpret the provision in such a way 
as to cure the mischief. This approach to judicial interpretation has been applied in relatively 
recent decisions of the House of Lords.103 The mischief rule is a restrictive example of a 
purposive approach to interpretation. It only allows the judge to look to the purpose of the 
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statute, or statutory provision, when the text is ambiguous.104 As this thesis progresses, a model 
of purposive interpretation will be built which is considerably wider in scope than the 
traditional mischief rule. 
2.2 A purposive approach to law 
Whilst the literal rule of interpretation has traditionally dominated, a gradual move towards a 
purposive approach has been identified by several commentators. MacCormick noted that there 
has been “a certain tendency in the judiciary towards more purposive and less formalistic styles 
of interpretation in the UK since 1969.”105  This shift in emphasis towards a purposive approach 
was also observed by Lord Diplock but he saw the change as having commenced in the 1940s: 
“If one looks back to the actual decisions of this House (of Lords) on questions of statutory 
construction over the last thirty years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend 
away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions.”106 
Two prominent theorists of the purposive approach to law are Aharon Barak and Guy Davidov. 
Barak, a former President of the Israeli Supreme Court, has formulated a theory of purposive 
interpretation which he applies across all legal systems.107 Davidov has developed a theory of 
purposive interpretation which applies specifically to labour law.108 Both theories will be 
analysed. Thereafter, a modified form of purposive interpretation will be suggested which, it 
will be argued, is a better fit for modern labour law.  
2.3 Barak’s theory of purposive interpretation 
For Barak, the starting point of purposive interpretation is to “realise the goal that the legal text 
is designed to realise.”109 By this, he means that the aim of the act of interpretation is to satisfy 
the purpose of the legal text being considered. He sees the judge as a partner with the legislature 
in the development of the law, rather than an agent.110 The judge’s role in this partnership "is 
to help bridge the gap between law and society’s changing needs... (and to) ...preserve 
democracy and defend the constitution.”111 This aspect of judicial partnership will be referred 
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to again later in this thesis. For now, the theory of purposive interpretation which will be 
advocated in this thesis sits well with the foregoing aspects of Barak’s theory. 
However, other aspects of Barak’s theory are unsatisfactory. His attempt to apply the purposive 
approach across all areas of the law, without considering the differences between separate areas 
of law, is guilty of over-generalisation. As outlined in the Introduction, different areas of the 
law will require different modes of judicial reasoning.  Barak’s theory fails to take this into 
account. His aim is to construct a “one-size-fits-all" judicial approach to cover the entire legal 
system. The sheer scale of the approach he attempts can lead him into forging concepts which 
are, at times, both confused and confusing. For instance, he describes how the judge, who 
engages in purposive interpretation, must simultaneously synergise subjective and objective 
purposes.112 Subjective purpose relates to ideas such as authorial intent (legislative intent, 
intentions of parties to a contract).113 Objective purpose relates to concepts such as the intent 
of the reasonable author, the legal system’s underlying values, policies and aims.114 However, 
he does not give concrete guidance on how the judge should go about synergising this wide 
range of factors in a simultaneous fashion.  
This over-generalisation also leads Barak in different directions when he wishes to move 
forward in a logical and consistent fashion. This is particularly problematic in his theory of 
statutory interpretation. For instance, he stresses the importance for the judge to respect the 
subjective intent of the author115 (by which he often seems to mean the actual intention of the 
legislature in relation to the statutory provision in question116) whilst also maintaining that the 
interpreter can pick from a range of whatever semantic possibilities the words of the interpreted 
text can sustain.117 It is suggested that the former approach ignores the (sometimes 
insurmountable) difficulties of trying to ascertain subjective legislative intent. A Parliamentary 
majority is not a singular entity when it comes to the voting process. It is, instead, a multiplicity 
of different voices, with different ideals and agendas, and it is sometimes not possible to ascribe 
a single intention to it as if it was a unitary whole. Given the indeterminate nature of language, 
coupled with the subjectivity inherent within each Member of Parliament’s understanding of 
what they were voting for, this notion of subjective legislative intent will often be difficult for 
the interpreter to ascertain with precision. Sometimes, it will of course be necessary for the 
court to look to Parliament’s subjective intentions, but this should be approached with caution 
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for the reasons given. Instead, the judge should prefer to look to the broader, underlying 
purposes of the statute and the broader legal system to influence her interpretation of a statutory 
provision. Indeed, ascertaining the abstracted levels of purpose in a statute is inevitably going 
to be easier, and more accurate, than trying to second-guess the intent that the legislature 
ascribed to specific statutory provisions. Consequently, it is suggested that, in the case of 
statutory interpretation, a better course for the judge to adopt is to explore the range of possible 
meanings which the words are capable of bearing, and to contextualise their meanings within 
the purpose of the statute and the legal system. As noted above, Barak does endorse this as one 
possible approach to statutory interpretation. This aspect of purposive interpretation will be 
explored in further detail shortly. 
Whilst this thesis has some reservations about certain aspects of Barak’s theory, there are other 
aspects which are more appealing. For example, Barak’s model of purposive interpretation 
favours a dynamic approach to legal interpretation.118 This thesis progresses on the basis that a 
dynamic approach to legal interpretation is essential to allow labour law to keep up with fast-
moving technological changes, shifts in societal values and different styles of working. When 
he advocates a dynamic approach to interpretation, Barak recognises that such changes take 
place over time and it is therefore necessary for the judge to view the statute as a creation which 
must evolve with those changes.119  So, under this model of dynamic interpretation, which is 
advocated by Barak and with which this thesis agrees, legal meaning is not “set in stone” at its 
creation but evolves in tandem with changes in society. This dynamic mode of judicial 
interpretation is necessary to allow labour law to achieve its principal purposes of redressing 
the inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship and restoring the dignity of 
the worker. The capitalist system, which pre-exists, and has subsisted throughout, these societal 
and technological changes, relies on an unequal power dynamic in the power relationship.  
Indeed, the system continually exploits such changes to its own benefit. A good example of 
this is the emergence of the gig economy. The capitalist system has exploited technological 
advances to introduce modes of working, such as the gig economy, which reinforce and 
strengthen the power imbalance in the employment relationship. Legal interpretation must be 
dynamic and fluid to keep pace with these constantly evolving tactics.   
Given the suitability of dynamic interpretation to modern labour law, and its general 
congruence with a purposive approach, it will be added as a further component to the purposive 
approach which is being built in this thesis.  
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Whilst Barak’s theory is directed to the entire legal system, Davidov focuses his approach on 
labour law. Consequently, it is necessary to analyse his theory to see if it can assist in 
constructing a judicial approach to purposive interpretation in UK labour law. 
 
2.4 Davidov and a purposive approach to labour law 
Davidov sees the purposive approach to labour law as being the most intuitive approach – he 
says, “it is even trivial.”120 Davidov makes a good point: it does make intuitive sense for the 
law to be developed in accordance with its fundamental purposes. However, as Davidov notes, 
there is a “mismatch between goals and means in labour law.”121 When he refers to this 
mismatch, Davidov means that there is an increasing divide between those workers who need 
labour law protections and those who have them.122 This can be as a result of the inadequacy 
of legal tests which determine employment status.123 It can also be the result of compliance and 
enforcement problems.124 He also means that labour laws are becoming increasingly “obsolete” 
because the law has failed to keep up with profound changes in working patterns.125 Davidov 
recognises that the tactics which are being increasingly used  by employers, to evade their 
obligations towards workers, is one of the root causes of the mismatch.126 He also attributes 
the increasing obsoleteness of labour laws to factors such as globalisation, shifting cultural 
norms and technological progress.127 This thesis agrees with Davidov’s broad outline of the 
some of the main challenges facing labour law today, and their root causes. They are largely to 
blame for the crisis in UK labour law that was described in the introduction.  
Davidov’s definition of the purposive approach is simplistic yet effective: 
“When thinking about a specific law...whether it requires changes, or how to interpret it, or 
whether it is constitutional – one must articulate the goals of the specific law...At the same time 
it is useful in such cases to have a general understanding of why labour laws are needed, using 
it as a starting point to examine the purpose of the specific regulation.”128 
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Davidov also places considerable emphasis on the dignity of the worker.129 He cites the 
minimum wage as an example of how the worker’s dignity can be reasserted.130 On a more 
abstract level, the thrust of Davidov’s argument, and it is a sound one, is that the worker is a 
human being, not a commodity, and this necessarily entails that, whilst the worker should be 
free to sell her labour power, “some limitations are necessary, and labour and employment 
regulations accordingly try to protect our health and our rights at work.”131 As Atkinson has 
astutely observed, Davidov’s ideas on the purposes of labour law are not dissimilar to Kahn-
Freund's.132 
Davidov argues that labour laws are necessary because “employment is characterised by a set 
of unique vulnerabilities, which can best be described from three separate viewpoints: 
organisational, social / psychological, and economic.”133 The organisational viewpoint is 
substantiated by his valid observation that managerial control is necessary to operate in the 
workplace.134 This need for hierarchical levels then results in a “democratic deficit”135 in the 
workplace and strengthens the employer’s ability to exercise control over workers.136 This 
hierarchy results in a relationship of subordination in the employment relationship.137 In 
addition to economic dependency, which is the most obvious form of dependence, Davidov 
highlights the social and psychological dependence of the worker on the employer.138 He 
produces an impressive array of empirical evidence to substantiate these claims.139 As he 
rightly points out, with reference to empirical examples, work: 
“...gives us opportunities for personal expression and creativity. It is a source of intellectual 
progress and advancement. It shapes our personal identities, facilitating self-development and 
realisation...provides the means to dignity, self-respect and self-esteem. It is part of our 
conception of human flourishing.”140 
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139 Davidov points to empirical studies which stress the social and psychological aspects of work – MOW 
International Research Team, The Meaning of Working (Academic Press 1987) Robert E Lane, The Market 
Experience (Cambridge University Press 1991), Itzhak Harpaz, The Meaning of Work in Israel: Its Nature and 
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As Adams has pointed out, this element of Davidov’s work goes further than Kahn-Freund by 
emphasising the function of work on social identity.141  
This thesis agrees with the foregoing elements of Davidov’s theory. However, at this point, the 
theory of purposive interpretation advocated in this thesis departs from Davidov’s model. This 
thesis constructs a theory of purposive interpretation with reference to relevant case-law. 
Davidov’s theory lacks that component and his theory is liable, in this respect, to operate at an 
insufficiently high level of abstraction.142 Concrete examples of the purposive approach, by 
way of references to case-law, are necessary because they demonstrate how the theoretical 
components work in everyday practice. In addition, Davidov’s theory is intended to be applied 
to any national system of labour law.143 In this way, it is too broad in its perspective. There can 
be wide variations in the substance, and form, of different national systems of labour law.144 
Davidov’s approach fails to take this into account. This thesis differs from Davidov’s as it 
focuses on the application of the purposive method of interpretation to one jurisdiction. The 
scope of this thesis is also narrower than Davidov’s model. Whilst Davidov’s theory 
incorporates desired legislative reforms and the judicial approach to labour law,145 this thesis 
focuses solely on the judicial approach for reasons that were outlined in the Introduction. In 
addition, Davidov’s theory claims that redressing the “inequality of bargaining power” in the 
employment relationship should not be a central goal of labour law146 whilst this thesis takes 
the opposite view. Accordingly, Davidov’s argument on this point needs to be explored in more 
depth at this stage. 
Davidov’s argument, in essence, is that inequality of bargaining power is not a helpful goal for 
labour law because all contracts have inequality of bargaining power. Indeed, Davidov seems 
to apply this feature to all contracts, including those out with the employment sphere.147 
Consequently, he prefers to focus on ameliorating the worker’s dependence on the employer 
and her vulnerabilities in the workplace as this is more tailored to the specific goals of labour 
law.148 However, Davidov’s approach here does not resemble the reality of many contractual 
agreements. One can think of many contracts which have approximate equality of bargaining 
 
141 Adams, Z, Review, Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law  (2016) CLJ 632, at p.632. 
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power. Many commercial contracts, say a contract between two relatively sized small-to-
medium-sized businesses (SMEs), will often involve an approximate equality of bargaining 
power. In addition, Davidov is vague on what he means when he says that no contract will ever 
have equality of bargaining power. He might mean that it is not possible to obtain absolute, 
mathematical symmetry in the bargaining power of two contracting parties; that there may be 
subtle nuances in the power dynamic. If that is what he means, it is not a strong objection. 
Mathematical symmetry, in the context of bargaining power, is probably impossible in the real 
world; the important point is that both parties have an approximation of equality. By contrast, 
the working relationship generally has a wide disparity of inequality of bargaining power. It is 
the relative difference in the bargaining power between, say, two SME businesses in a 
commercial contract on the one hand, and between the employer and the worker on the other, 
which justifies labour law’s goal of redressing the inequality of bargaining power in the 
employment relationship. The gap in power is generally much greater in the latter than it is in 
the former. This has been recognised by the UK Supreme Court and this distinction has justified 
its differential treatment of employment and commercial contracts.149 
Nevertheless, this thesis agrees with Davidov’s contentions that the employment relationship 
is infused with vulnerabilities and dependency. The major difference between the model 
advocated here, and Davidov’s, is that the present model does not see inequality of bargaining 
power as requiring a separation from subordination and vulnerability, as his theory seems to. 
Instead, as was outlined in Chapter 1, the subordination and vulnerability are inextricably 
linked with the original default position of the contracting parties – a stark inequality of 
bargaining power. 
2.5 - Defining a new model of purposive interpretation 
This thesis proposes a new model of purposive judicial interpretation. The first, and most 
obvious component of the theory, the need to interpret the legal text considering its purpose, 
does seem simplistic or “trivial” as Davidov described it. Nevertheless, it is submitted that, 
despite its apparent simplicity, it is the most effective way for judges to interpret labour laws. 
As outlined earlier in this Chapter, the law constructs the employment relationship using 
apparently neutral legal concepts such as private property and freedom of contract. However, 
these concepts are weighed heavily in favour of the employer, for the reasons outlined above. 
This results in the employer having a “default” advantage over the worker in the employment 
relationship. This advantage places employers in a position where they can impose whatever 
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terms and conditions on workers they wish. Such a situation is morally unacceptable because 
it can lead to the exploitation of human beings and has the attendant risk of assaulting their 
intrinsic human dignity. Labour laws are therefore best seen as a series of interventions which 
are necessary to try and level the playing field in the power dynamics of the employment 
relationship in order to prevent scope for the abuse of workers and to thereby protect their 
dignity. Each sub-set of labour law in the UK system should therefore have a discrete purpose, 
or set of purposes, which work towards the goal of ameliorating the power imbalance between 
the employer and the worker.  
Of course, a theory of purposive interpretation must have more than just one component. 
Indeed, it must be a model with multiple components which, operating together, allow the judge 
to interpret the law in question in a way which best conforms with the law’s purposes. So far 
in this thesis, the purposive model being built comprises four theoretical components: (1) The 
need to interpret the legal text considering its purpose(s). (2) The realisation that the 
employment relationship is based on subordination and vulnerabilities. (3) A flexible and 
dynamic approach to legal interpretation. (4) A requirement for the judge to have the inequality 
of bargaining power that is inherent in the employment relationship, and the need to reassert 
the dignity of the worker, at the forefront of her mind when interpreting a legal text. Of course, 
the judge will also have to have other considerations at the forefront of her mind, including the 
economic interests of employers and the need for businesses to be profitable generators of 
employment, when deciding a labour law case. Consequently, the relevant legal, and factual, 
matrix in a labour law case must take account of the inherent power imbalance in the 
employment relationship along with broader economic considerations. It is then for the judge 
to decide which weight to accord these often-competing considerations.  
These are the building blocks of the purposive “mode” in the labour law context and further 
blocks will be added as the thesis progresses. Having developed these theoretical components, 
it is now necessary to delve deeper into the purposive approach being advocated. This thesis 
has already stressed that a particular judicial “mode” must be contextualised to cater for the 
area of law that is being adjudicated. This “mode” will also differ depending on the nature of 
the legal source that is being interpreted. The three primary sources of labour law are statute, 
the common law and contracts. Each source of law, by its intrinsic nature, requires its own 
mode of interpretation. For instance, the common law, in general, gives the judge a wider 
margin of interpretative leeway than statutory interpretation allows. As a result, the judge will 
usually need to alter her mode of legal reasoning if she is alternating between statutory and 
common law interpretation in a case. For the sake of brevity, the need for the judge to alter her 
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mode of reasoning, depending on the source of law being interpreted, will be referred to as 
“contextual purposive interpretation.” This concept will now be analysed in greater detail. 
2.5.1 Statutory interpretation 
Given the difficulties in ascertaining Parliament’s subjective intent, a better way to begin the 
process of purposive interpretation is for the judge to identify the meaning of the relevant  
statutory provision. That does not mean the plain meaning of the words but the meaning which 
best fits the purpose(s) of the statute and the legal system (although sometimes the plain 
meaning will happen to be the meaning which best fits the purpose of the statute). To recap, a 
purposive approach to statutory intention must, given the indeterminacy of language, recognise 
that a statutory word, or words, are often capable of bearing more than one possible meaning. 
Some interpretations may be more obvious than others, but that does not exclude the others if 
the others fall within the range of possible meanings. So, the purposive approach allows the 
judge to depart from a more obvious meaning of a statute. The less obvious reason, which still 
must be a possible, or logical, interpretation, is chosen because it is the best interpretation of 
the statute’s purpose. This allows the judge a greater degree of flexibility and room for 
interpretive manoeuvre than the literal approach (as was demonstrated in Chapter 1’s analysis 
of the purposive approach in a lineage of House of Lords cases). Moreover, the judge may also 
have to examine the purposes of other, relevant statutes, and the purpose of the legal system, 
to assist her in the interpretative process. 
Despite the measure of flexibility, and dynamism, in the purposive approach, there must still 
be limits on the level of discretion it gives to the judge. Otherwise, permissible interpretation 
may transgress into the boundaries of impermissible judicial legislation. This will be explored 
further in section 2.7. For now, a necessary constraint on the judge’s discretion using a 
purposive approach will require, as Barak notes, that the meaning chosen must be one which 
is within the range of “semantic possibilities.”150 By this, Barak means that the word, or series 
of words, must be within the range of possible interpretations that the language can logically 
bear. So, the theory of purposive judicial interpretation being advocated here resembles Barak’s 
approach in respect of the “semantic possibility” criterion.   
The theory proposed in this thesis also places considerable emphasis on individual labour 
rights. International human rights treaties, such as the ECHR, are relevant in this context. 
Consequently, when the judge tries to ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision, she must 
also strive to find an interpretation which complies with the UK’s internat ional human rights 
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obligations. It will often be possible for the judge to find a meaning which both complies with 
the statute’s purpose and the UK’s international human rights obligations.151 This will often be 
possible when the judge interprets the ECHR because of the purposive nature of the Ghaidan 
principle152 which allows the judge to choose from within a range of possible semantic 
meanings when determining whether the statutory provision is capable of being interpreted in 
accordance with the ECHR.153 So, the Ghaidan approach to statutory interpretation adopts a 
similar flexible purposive model of statutory interpretation as the model that is advocated in 
this thesis. A relevant example of this is the Gilham case which will be analysed in Chapter 3.  
What, though, if there is a contradiction between the interpretation of the purpose of the statute 
and the UK’s obligations under the ECHR? This is a difficult question, and one which seems 
to arise rarely in the case law.154 If such a contradiction is irresolvable, the domestic 
interpretation must “win the day” and the judge must respect the Sovereignty of Parliament, 
and the Separation of Powers, and declare that the legislation is incompatible with the ECHR 
under section 4 HRA.  
Worse still, what if it is not possible to ascertain a reasonable meaning from within the range 
of semantic possibilities? This is what happened in the Litster and Pickstone cases in Chapter 
1. In such cases (which will often involve the literal interpretation resulting in an absurd or 
illogical result) the judge must interpret the statutory provision in accordance with the broad 
purposes of the statute and the legal system. If necessary, she may insert additional words into 
the statutory provision (or read the statute down) to allow the provision to cohere with the 
purposes of the statute and the legal system. In unusual cases such as these, the judge may also 
have to have recourse to subjective legislative intent, and refer to sources such as Hansard, to 
ascertain such intent. Whilst the potential weaknesses of such an approach have been 
highlighted, they may be necessary as part of a judicial effort to achieve a decision which both 
adheres with the purpose of the statute and respects Parliamentary Sovereignty.  
The process of statutory interpretation, under the purposive model being advocated here, must 
involve dynamic, rather than static, interpretation. Static interpretation, which is associated 
with the literal or “plain-meaning” interpretation of the statute, has the effect of “freezing”155 
 
151 For example, there have been a very small number of section 4 “declarations of incompatibility” since the 
Human Rights Act 1998 came into force – Stark, S.W, Facing facts: judicial approaches to section 4 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, L.Q.R. 2017, 133(Oct), 631-655, at p.631. 
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the statute’s meaning at the time of its enactment.156 This literal mode of interpretation will 
therefore often fail to take account of societal changes. Given the rapid nature of technological 
advancement in our society, coupled with the ongoing transformations in working patterns, a 
static interpretation will not allow our labour laws to keep pace with such changes. 
Consequently, the need for flexibility and dynamism in labour law is another strong reason for 
preferring the purposive approach. This need for flexibility is also seen in the judicial approach 
to the common law, which will now be considered. 
2.5.2 Common law interpretation  
As mentioned earlier, the common law typically allows judges a greater degree of interpretative 
freedom than statute. As will be demonstrated in the Autoclenz case analysis, the judge may 
have to pick a rule or precedent, from among a conflicting line of authorities, to achieve the 
outcome which bests fits the purpose of the applicable law(s). This will generally involve 
identifying, and weighing, legal principles. This process will be exemplified in the Autoclenz 
and Hounga case analyses and expanded upon in the review of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
adjudication in later sections and chapters. In the meantime, it should be stressed that the 
purposive approach advocated here may sometimes mean that the judge must apply a principle, 
rule or precedent which is not the most obvious one to apply to the circumstances of the case.  
It must, of course, be relevant and cohere with the broader legal system, but it need not be the 
most obvious, or apparent, route for the judge to traverse. This theory will be developed in later 
sections and chapters. 
2.5.3 Contractual interpretation 
The contract for services, or of service, are the predominant sources of contracts in labour law. 
These are the documents which confer employment status, or otherwise, and set out the parties’ 
obligations. As described earlier, the issue of employment status is a pressing issue in modern 
labour law given technological advances which result in constantly evolving patterns of 
working, and the inequality of bargaining power that typically infuses the creation of 
contractual arrangements. As a result, contractual interpretation in labour law requires a highly 
particularised method of interpretation. As previously mentioned, some employers, typically 
with their legal advisors’ assistance, use “boilerplate” contractual clauses to evade obligations 
towards their workers. These contracts are then offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. The 
typical practice is for the employer to provide a contract to the worker which deliberately 
 
156 Ibid, pp.267 - 8. 
   
 
 37  
 
misrepresents her as a self-employed contractor157 and thereby denies the worker her legal 
rights and protections. So, there is often an incongruence between the terms of the contract, 
and the everyday reality of the working arrangements. Given these evasive tactics, it will often 
be necessary for the judge, who takes a purposive approach to contractual interpretation, to 
look at a wide range of extrinsic evidence to the contract to ascertain the parties’ real position. 
Such extrinsic evidence may include details of the day-to-day working practices to check 
whether they align with the contractual terms. This purposive approach to contractual 
interpretation will be fleshed out and exemplified in the Autoclenz case analysis. 
However, the purposive approach mentioned above, which looks to extrinsic aids, cannot 
always act as an effective judicial countermeasure to employers who use evasive tactics to 
misrepresent employment status. Sometimes, employers will use legal advisors to draft 
incredibly convoluted contractual arrangements which, on a strict literal reading, may highlight  
elements which are suggestive of self-employment status even though the overall relationship 
is more reflective of an employer / worker relationship under the relevant legislation. Indeed, 
the “sham” arrangements laid down in a multiplicity of such technically worded contracts may 
be a more subtle and insidious form of “sham” than was the case in Autoclenz. That was the 
situation in Uber. In such cases, the judge, if she is suspicious of the presence of a complex 
sham, must go further than looking at the working practices of the respective parties. In line 
with the purposive approach advocated in this thesis, she must also interpret the contract with 
an emphasis on the underlying purposes of the relevant legislation. So, if she needs to determine 
employment status as defined in a certain statute, but also suspects a complex sham is at play,  
this process of interpretation must contextualise the protective purposes of the statute over and 
above the literal terms of the contract. Only the purposive approach, used in this way - in an 
intuitive manner by the judge - can act as an effective counterbalance to employers’ evasive 
tactics. If the judiciary eschews the purposive approach and prefers a literal, contractual 
approach in such cases (as was the approach of Underhill LJ in the Uber case), then legal 
advisors will continue to be able to draft, and re-draft, complex contractual arrangements to 
“get round” the latest case-law in this area. This semantic game of “cat-and-mouse" defeats the 
expansive, protective purposes of the statutory protections which Parliament conferred on the 
intermediate category of “worker”. On the other hand, the purposive approach allows the 
protective purposes of the statute to be met. By way of example, the right to protection for 
“whistleblowing” is commonly claimed by “limb b” workers. Clearly, this is an example of 
legislation which has an elementary social purpose. Accordingly, Parliament included the 
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intermediate category of “worker” within the protective scope of the relevant legislation to 
allow a broader range of individuals to benefit from this right. This expansive requirement of 
greater inclusivity therefore necessitates a broad, purposive mode of interpretation. Otherwise, 
the purposes of the statute will be frustrated by an unduly restrictive interpretation of  worker 
status. So, if a judge must decide on an especially difficult question relating to employment 
status, she should do so using her intuition to detect a potential sham as an initial starting point. 
If a sham is suspected, the judge must proceed with the interpretative exercise with the purposes 
of the legislation, rather than the nuances of the contractual wording, at the forefront of her 
mind. This purposive approach will be described, and analysed, in more detail in the Uber case 
analysis in Chapter 4. 
The foregoing analysis allows a fifth and sixth component to be added to the purposive mode 
of interpretation advocated in this thesis: (5) There is a need for contextual purposive 
interpretation. (6) The judge must strive to come to an interpretation, when it is possible to do 
so, which accords with the UK’s international human rights obligations. These components 
comprise the foundations of a basic working model of purposive interpretation. Further 
components will be added as the thesis progresses. To build further foundations, it will be 
necessary to analyse Dworkin’s theory relating to the contextual use of legal principles and 
relevant case-law from the UK Supreme Court. However, before doing this, it is necessary to 
address criticisms which have been levelled at the purposive approach. 
2.6 Defending the purposive approach  
One of the most prominent critics of the purposive approach was Antonin Scalia, a former 
judge of the US Supreme Court. As Davidov notes, Scalia, one of the most prominent figures 
of the “new textualist” movement, argued that judges should focus on the legal text and 
interpret it in line with what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean at the time 
of its enactment.158 Indeed, Scalia argued that a purposive approach would lead the judge to 
apply the law as he wanted it to be, rather than how it was.159 However, it is submitted that this 
objection to the purposive approach is flawed. The purpose, or purposes, of the law allow the 
judge an objective measure which she can resort to when interpreting statutes. The judge is 
bound to adhere to the purpose(s) of the law when interpreting a legal text.  Scalia’s criticism 
ignores this. It also ignores the indeterminacy of language and the possibility that two 
reasonable people may interpret different, but equally plausible, meanings to a particular word 
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or phrase. ￼ Taking Hart’s famous example of “no vehicles in the park,”160 it is suggested that 
all reasonable people would interpret a car as a vehicle. However, the situation is likely to be 
different with mobility scooters: some reasonable people might regard them as vehicles whilst 
others will not.  
Nevertheless, it is accepted that certain aspects of new textualism, such as its de-emphasis on 
subjective legislative intent161, have solid theoretical grounding. However, even if the “new 
textualist” approach, as described above, has some merit in the interpretation of certain areas 
of the law, it is highly unsuited to judicial interpretation of labour law disputes. Labour law is 
a fast-changing area of the law. Working methods are constantly evolving in tandem with 
technological progress; a phenomenon most sharply exemplified by the rapid growth of the gig 
economy. New textualist interpretations freeze the statute’s meaning at the time of its 
creation.162 If such a method of interpretation was to be routinely applied to labour law disputes, 
the law would fail to keep pace with changes in working methods and technological growth. 
Instead, as has already been argued, a dynamic mode of judicial interpretation is necessary in 
labour law cases to allow the law to keep pace with these socio-economic changes and continue 
to meet its purposes despite these changes.  
As Barak has highlighted, the other main line of criticism of the purposive approach is that it 
leads to less certainty and security than the literal approach. Again, this criticism lacks logical, 
or empirical substantiation – as Barak notes, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the 
teleological systems of law in Continental Europe lack the certainty and security of English 
law, where the literal approach has historically dominated.163  
So, the main criticisms of a purposive approach, at least with respect to labour law, are not 
well-founded. Having established this, it is now necessary to build further components onto 
the purposive model advocated in this thesis. 
 
2.7 - Dworkin and legal principles 
Ronald Dworkin’s theory of adjudication, as it relates to legal principles, will be shown to be 
a crucial component of the purposive approach advocated in this thesis. As will be 
demonstrated, the use of such principles simultaneously fosters judicial flexibility whilst acting 
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as a necessary constraining factor on the judge’s discretion. Before moving on to consider how 
Dworkin’s theory can benefit the purposive approach, it is necessary to analyse what he meant 
when he referred to the utility of legal principles in the context of adjudication. 
Dworkin’s theory relating to legal principles, which he focuses heavily on in his earlier work,164 
stems largely from his criticisms of the theory of legal positivism espoused by HLA Hart.165 
Dworkin found Hart’s description of the law, and its purported interpretation by the judge, 
unconvincing.166 He was opposed to Hart’s position that the judge decides cases either 
according to rules or, where no clear rule applies, the judge must then invoke extra-legal 
considerations to fill the legal lacuna.167 Dworkin’s view was that this account of adjudication 
ignored the application of legal principles in cases.168 He also saw Hart’s position as 
undemocratic because it allowed the unelected judiciary to engage in acts of judicial legislation 
(when invoking extra-legal considerations) and to issue binding legal decisions against parties 
ex post facto.169 
This attack on Hart’s positivist theory allowed Dworkin theoretical space to stress the 
importance of legal principles to the law. Dworkin illustrated the existence, and importance, of 
legal principles in adjudication by referring to the case of Riggs v Palmer.170 In this case, a 
New York court had to decide whether a man who had murdered his grandfather, in order to 
obtain his inheritance under his grandfather’s will, could benefit from the inheritance. A literal 
interpretation of the legal rules relating to wills, and the circumstances of inheritance, would 
have allowed the murderer to obtain his ill-gotten inheritance.171 Despite this literal 
interpretation of the applicable rules, the court denied him the inheritance based on the principle 
that “no man should benefit from his own wrong,”172 So, in Riggs, the court was able to 
circumvent the application of the apparently relevant legal rules, and avoid a morally 
unacceptable outcome, by applying legal principles instead of legal rules. This begs the 
question: what, according to Dworkin, is the difference between a legal rule and a legal 
principle? 
According to Dworkin, either a rule applies to the factual circumstance in a case, or it does not. 
The rule decides the case if it applies to the facts. If it does not apply, it is irrelevant to the case 
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at hand.173 By contrast, legal principles do not necessarily decide a case, one way or another, 
but can be applied by the judge in a contextual fashion.174 This is because principles have a 
relative “weight” which may lean in favour of (or against) the application of a particular rule, 
whilst not being a determinative reason for the decision.175 For Dworkin, the resolution of hard 
cases involved the weighing of these competing principles. In addition, even when a principle 
is defeated in a case, it generally survives as a valid principle in the legal system. This is 
exemplified by Dworkin when referring to the principle that no man may benefit from his 
wrong. As he correctly observes, this is not a hard-and-fast rule: a long-established custom of 
trespass will grant the trespasser the right to cross land at his leisure.176 This is just one example 
of where the law allows an individual to benefit from his wrong. The important point is that 
principles have relative weight which depends on the factual circumstances of the individual 
case, and this will be expanded upon in this Chapter and in Chapter 3. In the meantime, the 
operation of these principles requires further explanation. 
A principle, or set of principles, can help to establish a new legal rule.177 This is what happened 
in the Riggs case: the principle that no man may benefit from his wrong established a rule 
prohibiting a murderer from inheriting under his victim’s will. Indeed, legal rules embody legal 
principles and the principle, or set of principles, thereby serve to justify the existence of the 
legal rule.178 For Dworkin, the application of the legal principle is justified by its moral 
appeal.179 Moreover, a principle, or set of principles, can lead to legal rules being changed by 
the judge.180 The principles of the legal system are, according to Dworkin, innumerable and 
constantly changing and they form part of the pre-existing legal order.181 As a result, Dworkin’s 
position is that, in hard cases, judges are not making new law (a view he attributes to positivists 
like Hart). Instead, they are merely finding pre-existing law, in the form of legal principles, to 
resolve the legal dispute.182 
Dworkin also emphasises the distinction between principles and policies. Judges must appeal 
to arguments of principle, not to arguments of policy.183 Indeed, his theory of integrity, which 
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will be outlined in more detail shortly, and which he develops in his later work,184 maintains 
that arguments of principles, which are based on individual rights, are the correct focus for the 
judiciary. Wider, policy-based goals are the province of the legislature.185 As Davies has 
demonstrated, Dworkin’s theory of rights includes scope for both absolute and qualified rights 
(most labour rights belonging to the latter category) and labour rights can potentially be 
subsumed under his theory of rights.186 
This distinction between legal rules and principles is well-exemplified in the Riggs case itself. 
As Simmonds has astutely observed, a Hartian positivist, who focuses on legal rules rather than 
legal principles, can only view the Riggs case in two possible ways: either the case was wrongly 
decided (because the literal application of the relevant rules was ignored by the court) or that 
the case was correctly decided because the judge has the power to disregard rules when he 
disagrees with them.187 The first viewpoint is obviously flawed: the court’s decision in Riggs 
prevented a murderer from benefitting from the will. The second viewpoint is also unacceptable 
as it gives judges far too much power: the necessary implication of the second viewpoint is the 
undemocratic conclusion that unelected judges can disregard legal rules according to their own 
whims and preferences. By contrast, the use of weighted principles, which can be used 
contextually by the judge, allows the judge ample flexibility to reach the correct outcome in 
cases whilst also constraining her discretion. This idea of constraint requires further unpacking  
with reference to Dworkin’s later writing. 
In Law’s Empire, Dworkin develops his theory of “law-as-integrity.” Dworkin’s theory of 
integrity requires judges to identify rights, and corresponding duties, as if they were adopted 
by the community, to express a “coherent conception of justice and freedom.”188 Guest 
summarises this theory of integrity neatly: 
“...the Dworkinian judge must look for an overall theory of the legal order as a whole, in the 
sense of an ordered set of principles and values under which the great bulk of the established 
statutes, cases and doctrines could be subsumed. The construction of such a theory demands 
attention to criteria of “fit” and “appeal”: one must find an account of the law that is an adequate 
“fit,” and that presents the law in its most morally appealing light.”189 
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As previously described , the judge who follows Dworkin’s theory of integrity will find the 
most morally attractive principle, or set of principles, to help decide the case. That principle 
will also be one that best fits the legal system; one that has been established in past decisions 
and can be selected to assist the judge in reaching a decision which coheres with the legal 
system.190 Indeed, coherence is central to Dworkin’s theory of integrity and acts as a 
constraining factor on the judge’s discretion. Under Dworkin’s theory, the judge is not 
permitted an untrammelled level of legal discretion, allowing her to invoke extra-legal 
considerations to fill apparent gaps in the law, Instead, the judge is bound to adopt the most 
morally attractive legal principles, which cohere with the overall system of law, to help resolve 
the legal dispute. In this way, Dworkin’s concepts of principle and coherence act as 
constraining factors on the judge. However, whilst discretion is constrained, Dworkin’s theory 
also allows the judge a reasonable level of flexibility in her search for the principles which 
integrity demands.  
Indeed, it is the wide-ranging, potentially innumerable and contextual nature of legal principles 
which helps foster judicial flexibility. This flexibility proves instrumental to the purposive 
approach to labour law advocated in this thesis. As previously described, principles can be 
applied by the judge in a contextual manner, depending on the circumstances of the case at 
hand, because they have relative weight. This weight allows the judge to reach an outcome 
which accords with the purpose(s) of the legal text under consideration. Greater weight can be 
given to a legal principle where to do so would further the purposes of the law under 
consideration. Conversely, a principle can be attributed lesser weight where that is necessary 
to comply with the purposes of the law. Indeed, as was demonstrated in the Riggs case, legal 
principles can be used by the judge to avoid an unduly literalistic interpretation of the legal 
text. In Riggs, one of the main purposes of the rules relating to inheritance, namely the 
individual’s right to make an autonomous choice regarding the beneficiaries of her assets upon 
her death, would have been frustrated by a literal interpretation. The principle endorsed by the 
court avoided this scenario. Moreover, as we shall come on to see in Chapter 3, Riggs is not 
unique in this respect. For instance, in the Autoclenz case analysis, it will be shown that the 
weighing of legal principles helped the Supreme Court to reach its conclusion. 
Given their desirable balance between flexibility and constraint, the use of Dworkinian 
principles constitute an additional component to the purposive approach which is being 
advocated in this thesis: (7) The use of principles, which have contextual weight can be used 
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to assist the judge in the purposive approach to legal interpretation. It will be necessary to return 
to Dworkin’s theories of adjudication in relation to the Gilham case analysis in Chapter 3 when 
the concept of dynamic legal interpretation is analysed. In the meantime, the practical 
application of Dworkinian principles, in a purposive context, will be exemplified in the 
Autoclenz case analysis. 
 
Chapter 3 – Purposive interpretation in the UK Supreme Court  
This chapter will demonstrate how the components of the recommended purposive model of 
interpretation have been adopted by the UK Supreme Court in hard legal cases. The purposive 
model will be shown to assist judges to reach decisions which conferred the appropriate remedy 
to each claimant whilst also being of systemic benefit to UK labour law. The case analyses 
show how the purposive approach has sufficient malleability to be applied to common law, 
statutory and contractual interpretation. In addition, this chapter will demonstrate how the 
purposive approach can also be employed across a wide range of legal sources such as the 
common law, the ECHR and other international treaties. This gives some hope that the 
purposive approach can be used, in a post-Brexit UK, to mitigate the adverse effects of potential 
deregulation and further the main goals of labour law. 
3.1- Autoclenz - a purposive approach to contractual interpretation 
3.1.1 - Background facts 
Autoclenz, the appellant, provided car valeting services. The 20 respondents (the “claimants” 
who initiated Employment Tribunal claims) were car valets for the appellant. The valets lodged 
Employment Tribunal claims for statutory paid annual leave, under Regulation 2(1) of the 
Working Time Regulations 1998 (WTR) and payments in accordance with the National 
Minimum Wage, under Regulation 2(1) of the National Minimum Wage Regulations 1999 
(NMWR).191 These claims were predicated on the basis that the claimants were “workers” as 
defined by the WTR and NMWR. Limb (a) of Regulation 2(1) applies to employees; limb (b) 
applies to workers providing services pursuant to a contract, whether express or implied and 
(if it is express) whether oral or in writing, whereby the individual undertakes to do or perform 
personally any work or services for another party to the contract whose status is not by virtue 
 
191 Autoclenz (SC), n.21, paragraphs 1 and 3. 
   
 
 45  
 
of the contract that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on 
by the individual. 
The appellant provided contractual agreements between the appellants and the valets to the 
Employment Tribunal.192 These documents tried to show that the valets were self-employed.193 
The employer’s position was that the valets were not entitled to the minimum wage and paid 
holidays because they were not employees or workers as defined by the WTR or the NMWR 
– they were self-employed.  The Tribunal held that the valets fell within both limbs of the 
definition of “worker” in the WTR and NMWR.194 After a series of unsuccessful appeals to the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal195 (EAT) and Court of Appeal,196 Autoclenz appealed to the 
Supreme Court, maintaining its position that the claimants were not entitled to these payments 
as they were self-employed independent contractors. 
3.1.2: Legal issues for the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court had to determine the employment status of the valets. In doing so, one of 
the main questions for the Court was that it had to choose between two competing traditions of 
contractual interpretation. 
One tradition, rooted in general commercial principles, was that the court could only look 
beyond the terms of the contract if the contract was a “sham”. This “sham test” was a strict 
test, laid down in the commercial context by the Court of Appeal in the case of Snook v London 
and West Riding Investments197 and arguably endorsed in the field of employment law198 by 
the Court of Appeal in the case of Consistent Group Limited v Kalwak and others.199 The sham 
test requires that both parties to the contract are misrepresenting the contractual relationship 
between them. There must be clear evidence of mutual deception.200 
The other tradition, enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Firthglow Limited (t/a Protectacoat) 
v Szilagyi,201 placed more emphasis on the power imbalance which is inherent in the 
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employment relationship.202 Given this power imbalance, the Firthglow decision states that the 
courts should be willing to look beyond the written terms of the contract, in situations which 
are broader than a suspected sham, to get to the commercial reality of the working 
relationship.203  
In Autoclenz, there was a disconnect between the terms of the contract (which pointed towards 
self-employment status) and the working practices “on the ground” (which suggested that the 
valets were workers).  
Consequently, the challenges for the Supreme Court were which line of precedent it should 
adopt; and how to compare, and weigh, the provisions in the contractual documents against the 
reality of the working relationships between Autoclenz and the valets. 
3.1.3: Summary of decision 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the appeal.204 Lord Clarke gave the only substantive 
judgement. He begins his analysis by stating that a purely literal reading of the contracts 
strongly suggests that they reflect a client / self-employment relationship.205 Lord Clarke also 
recognises the importance of the legal principle, under the general law of contract, that the 
express terms of the agreement are predominant.206 However, he then feels the need to look at 
several cases, within the field of labour law and in other areas of the law, which take a different 
approach to contractual interpretation.207 This brings Lord Clarke on to consider, with approval, 
the purposive approach taken by the Court of Appeal in the tenancy case of Bankway Properties 
Limited v Pensfold Dunsford.208 In this case, the Court of Appeal prevented a landlord from 
circumventing his obligations towards his tenant, under the Housing Act 1998 (1988 Act), by 
imposing an exorbitant rental increase on the tenant. Arden LJ (as she then was) adopted a 
purposive approach to the issues, holding that the landlord’s aim, when imposing the increase, 
was to evict the tenant and thereby contract out of the 1988 Act. This act of evasion ran contrary 
to the purposes of the Housing Act 1988, designed to confer protections on tenants, and was 
therefore impermissible.209 So, in Bankway, the protective purposes of the statute overrode the 
contractual wording. The statutory protections also took precedence over contractual terms in 
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the landlord and tenant case, Street v Mountford,210 which Lord Clarke also refers to with 
approval.211 Lord Clarke cites these cases as evidence that it is both necessary and legitimate 
for the judiciary to take an approach in certain cases, particularly those involving artificial 
contractual terms, which prioritises the broader purposive protections of the statute over the 
contractual terms.212  
Lord Clarke also recognises that the employment contract differs from general commercial 
contracts and so they may require different interpretative approaches.213 He was prepared to 
take a purposive interpretation to the issue of employment status to discern what the actual 
relationship of the parties was like on a day-to-day basis. Lord Clarke’s Opinion takes on a 
clear direction towards the conclusion that the contractual documents between Autoclenz and 
the valets did not represent the actual working arrangements. The “real-life” situation must be 
looked at.214 The emphasis towards practicalities is extended when Lord Clarke shares the 
concern of Elias J in Kalwak: 
“The concern to which tribunals must be alive is that armies of lawyers will simply place 
substitution clauses, or clauses denying any obligation to accept or provide work, in 
employment contracts, as a matter of form, even where such terms do not begin to reflect the 
real relationship.”215 
Lord Clarke goes on to opine that the sham approach taken in Snook could not be transposed 
to the employment situation as it was “too narrow.”216 By this stage in the judgement, Lord 
Clarke has considered the “sham” principle and decided that it did not have sufficient weight, 
in the context of labour law cases, to guide his Opinion. Instead, the correct approach was to 
broaden the analysis and ask what “was the true agreement between the parties?”217 In the 
labour law context, this was the approach taken by Elias J in Kalwak218 and by the Court of 
Appeal in the Szilagyi case.219 It was also the approach of Aikens LJ in the Court of Appeal in 
the present case.220 So, Lord Clarke can be seen to be widening the circumstances in which a 
purposive approach to contractual interpretation can be taken - there does not need to be 
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suspicion of an actual “sham” arrangement, under the Snook principle, before the court can 
look beyond the written terms of the contract.  
Lord Clarke then explicitly acknowledges that the employer will often be in a stronger 
bargaining position than the employee.221 Consequently, the actual practice of the parties may 
differ from the contractual terms agreed by the parties: 
“So the relative bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding whether 
the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the true agreement 
will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of which the written 
agreement is only a part. This may be described as a purposive approach to the problem. If so, 
I am content with that description.”222 
Accordingly, Lord Clarke held that the Employment Tribunal was entitled to hold that the 
valets were working under contracts of employment under limb (a) of Regulations 2(1) of the 
WTR and NMWR. It was also observed, obiter, that if the court was required to consider the 
position under limb (b), Lord Clarke would have also held that the valets were workers within 
limb (b).223 
3.1.4 Analysis of the decision 
Autoclenz was a seminal case. The Supreme Court gave explicit recognition to one of the main 
challenges in modern labour law: that employers try to evade their contractual obligations to 
their workers, typically by using legal advisers. Lord Clarke also acknowledged the power 
disparity in the employment relationship and the subordination and vulnerability that can flow 
from this disparity. In the Autoclenz case, the employer utilised its greater bargaining power to 
impose artificial contractual terms on the workers. The workers were then subject to the control 
of Autoclenz on a day-to-day basis, a further aspect of subordination, but unable to enjoy 
certain benefits associated with the employment relationship. This combination of inequality 
in bargaining power, coupled with the workers’ subordination, highlights the high level of 
vulnerability which the worker can be subjected to.  
It is suggested that Lord Clarke made the correct decision when he disapplied the Snook “sham” 
principle in this case. The requirement that both parties must misrepresent the employment 
relationship is inappropriate in a labour law context given the one-sided inequality of 
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bargaining power which infuses the creation of contractual documentation and the employment 
relationship itself. As described earlier in this thesis, the creation of contractual terms, which 
do not reflect the reality of the commercial practice, is more likely to be a one-sided affair in a 
labour law context: the employer issues the contract; the worker must then sign it if she wants 
the job. 
Indeed, it is notable that Lord Clarke weighed legal principles to resolve this case. The 
employer based its case on a combination of legal principles. As previously mentioned, the 
“sham” principle was relied upon, but this was given little weight by the court due to its 
inappropriate application to labour law cases. In addition, the principle of “freedom of contract” 
was argued for by the employer, but it was, again, given little to no weight as the contracts 
themselves did not reflect commercial reality. Furthermore, the principle that the “express 
terms of the contract are predominant” put forward by the employer was again given no weight 
because the express terms did not reflect the true nature of the relationship between Autoclenz 
and the valets. It was the “reality of what was agreed by the parties,” based principally on the 
importance attached to the principle of inequality of bargaining power, which took prominence 
in this case. So, in Autoclenz, the case is resolved by weighing competing legal principles. The 
contextual weight of these principles fosters the judicial creativity which the purposive 
approach requires. The sham principle is a good example of this: whilst it is given little to no 
weight in the employment relationship in Autoclenz, it may be given far more weight in another 
case involving commercial contracts, such as one between two relatively even-sized SME 
businesses which have approximate bargaining power and which have colluded to misrepresent  
contractual terms between them.224 As a result, the contextual use of legal principles, which 
involves assigning a weight to principles based on their moral appeal in the individual 
circumstances of a case, facilitates the individuated mode of judicial reasoning, described in 
the Introduction, which may need to be contextualised in relation to the area of the law being 
adjudicated, whilst also ensuring that the decision coheres with the broader legal system. 
In addition, Lord Clarke’s reliance on the Bankway and Street v Mountford cases is highly 
significant as it indicates a judicial willingness on his part to adopt a broad, purposive approach 
which places the protective purposes of the statute at the foreground of the judicial reasoning 
process. Indeed, he is approving the use of a broad interpretation to legislation, where this is 
necessary to achieve the statute’s purposes, in cases where the statutory protections conflict 
with artificial contractual wording. His reliance on these cases becomes even more relevant in 
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the analysis of Uber in Chapter 4 as it suggests that Autoclenz should be given a “statutory” 
rather than “contractual” interpretation.225 
Another important aspect of the Autoclenz decision is that it involved the purposive 
interpretation of case-law which did not derive from EU law. Indeed, the decision is based 
squarely within the four corners of common law precedents. The case is therefore a good 
example of how a purposive approach, using non-EU-derived legal sources, could assist the 
judiciary when adjudicating labour law disputes in a post-Brexit UK. 
Consequently, it is suggested that the purposive approach advocated in this thesis allowed the 
Supreme Court to reach a decision which reflected the reality of the situation. Clearly. the 
contractual documents did not reflect the true reality of the working relationship. The evidence 
accepted by the Employment Tribunal pointed strongly to the conclusion that the express terms 
of the contract were artificial: they had been created to evade the employer’s obligations under 
the employment relationship. The valets were not operating independent businesses. Instead, 
they were workers who were subjected to a high degree of control by Autoclenz. As a result, it 
was essential, in Autoclenz, that the protective provisions of the WTR and NMWR take 
precedence over the artificial wording in the contracts. This allowed the valets to obtain the 
statutory benefits to which they were entitled. It is also noteworthy that Lord Clarke astutely 
observed that the literal approach to contractual interpretation was incapable of red ressing this 
power imbalance. A literal interpretation of the contracts would have led to the conclusion that 
the valets were self-employed contractors. 
Bogg has commented that the purposive approach laid down by Lord Clarke in Autoclenz 
amounts to “a presumption in favour of worker or employee status which can only be rebutted 
by clear evidence to the contrary.”226 This thesis takes the view that Bogg’s suggestion of a 
general rule is correct. Indeed, Lord Clarke was advocating a general use of the purposive 
approach to interpretation in these types of labour law cases. This view is taken because, as 
shown above, Lord Clarke directly links his use of the purposive approach with the inherent 
power imbalance in the employment relationship and with reference to cases such as Bankway, 
which adopted a broad purposive approach. He clearly recognises that the power imbalance in 
the employment relationship was not unique to the Autoclenz case but a general, and 
predominant, feature of the employment relationship. The link between the use of the purposive 
approach, and the power imbalance in the employment relationship, is therefore better viewed 
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as a general normative template laid down by Lord Clarke for such cases, rather than a tailored 
solution to one individual case. This level of generality supports Bogg’s interpretation. In 
addition, this rebuttable presumption also brings the personal scope of labour law more into 
line with its purposes. The conferral of rights to an intermediate category of workers, under 
legislation such as the NMWA and the WTR, reflects the inclusive approach of the legislature. 
Indeed, fundamental social rights are being extended to an intermediate category who fall 
somewhere between employees and independent contractors. This inclusivity is well 
represented by Bogg's rebuttable presumption as it confers these rights, at least on a prima facie 
level, to a broad range of intermediate workers. The presumption also provides the law with a 
mechanism to counteract the evasive tactics of those employers who insist on boilerplate 
contracts, which misrepresent the real working arrangements to avoid their obligations under 
the employment relationship, and which are generally non-negotiable. It has a counteractive 
effect because it imposes a reverse burden on the employer to provide clear evidence that the 
individual is genuinely self-employed. Consequently, it is suggested that Bogg’s presumption 
is both a sensible and a desirable interpretation of the Autoclenz decision. 
As a result, an eighth component, specifically contextualised to employment status, should be 
added to the definition of purposive judicial interpretation advocated in this thesis: (8) that 
there should be a presumption in favour of worker or employee status which can only be 
rebutted by clear evidence to the contrary.  
Consequently, Autoclenz demonstrates the value of the purposive approach to labour law. It 
also substantiates the importance of several of the components in the purposive model that have 
been built in this thesis. Perhaps the most important component of the model is the inherent 
power disparity in the employment relationship. After all, redressing this disparity is the central 
goal of labour law. Autoclenz was also important because it recognised the importance of this 
power imbalance. On that note, it is encouraging to see that the Supreme Court has since built 
on this aspect of the reasoning in the Autoclenz case. This brings the thesis on to an analysis of 
the Unison case. 
3.2 Unison – redressing the power imbalance via a purposive approach 
3.2.1 Background facts 
UNISON brought judicial review proceedings against the Employment Tribunals and the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order (“the Fees Order”). The Fees Order, giving the Lord 
Chancellor the power to introduce Employment Tribunal Fees, was secondary legislation 
which derived from section 42(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (the 2007 
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Act). Prior to the introduction of the Fees Order, a Claimant could proceed with an Employment 
Tribunal claim, or an appeal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, without paying a fee. 
UNISON challenged the Fees Order on several grounds. The ground that proved most crucial 
to the decision was that the fees imposed restricted access to justice under English and 
European law.227 
3.2.2 - Redressing the power imbalance 
Lord Reed gave the leading judgement, with unanimous agreement from the other judges. He 
starts his speech by recognising that there is an inherent power imbalance between employer 
and employee; the former generally having more power than the latter.228 He then explains that 
it has been necessary for Parliament to confer rights upon employees to mitigate the effects of 
this imbalance. He emphasises, at this early point in his judgement, that, for these rights to have 
substance, they must be enforceable in practice.229 However, Lord Reed is conscious that the 
ET fees were having a deterrent effect on prospective claimants – there had been a 66 – 70 
percent230 reduction in ET claims since the ET fees had been introduced. This was resulting in 
“systemic”231 problems for labour law – claimants were increasingly unable, or unwilling, to 
enforce their labour rights. 
So, Lord Reed is taking a purposive approach, articulating the main purpose of labour law at 
an early point in his speech: to redress the power imbalance in the employment relationship.  
The rest of his judgement is crafted to ensure that the system of labour law meets this purpose, 
or goal. To do this, Lord Reed constructs a universal right of access to justice by articulating a 
refined judicial conception of the rule of law.232 By constructing a universal right of access to 
justice, and new judicial exposition of the rule of law, Lord Reed is also invoking a more 
general purpose of the judiciary: to constrain the actions of the Executive. Indeed, Lord Reed 
reaches a fundamental cornerstone of his judgement; when he states that the “constitutional 
right of access to the courts is inherent in the rule of law.”233 Lord Reed goes on to state that a 
fundamental requirement of the rule of law is that the courts can constrain the unlawful actions 
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of the Executive.234 In order to fulfil this purpose, it is necessary for everyone to have access 
to the courts otherwise “laws are liable to become a dead letter.”235 
Crucially, Lord Reed develops his conception of the rule of law to further the enforcement of 
labour rights. He emphasises that the rights conferred must be effectively enforced by 
sanctions, and that it is necessary for people to be able to access courts because people, and 
businesses, need to be aware that they have rights and obligations, and can enforce their rights 
when necessary.236 So, Lord Reed is explicating a model which has practical application in the 
real world – it is not sufficient to say that a person has a labour “right,” because some legal rule 
says that is the case. For the right to be a valid right, Lord Reed stresses that it must also be 
realisable, enforceable and backed by sanctions.   
3.2.3 - Brexit and common law constitutional rights 
Unison is relevant for the purposes of this thesis because it builds on the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Autoclenz, specifically the need to ameliorate the power imbalance in the 
employment relationship. It is also relevant given that Lord Reed was able to make extensive 
use of the English common law, and a body of case-law which supported the common law 
constitutional right of access to justice, as part of his purposive approach. Indeed, Lord Reed’s 
judgement traces the right of access to justice back to the Magna Carta of 1215 and the 
institutional writings of Coke and Blackstone.237 Having reviewed the earliest expressions of 
the right of access to justice in English law, Lord Reed then continues to make use of modern 
common law precedent to construct his conceptions of the rule of the law and the right of access 
to justice.238 The common law, rather than the ECHR or EU law, is the bedrock of his 
judgement. EU law is considered, as is the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, but they are dealt with 
briefly by Lord Reed to show that the principles underlying European authorities in this area 
support the English common law principles.239 
So, Lord Reed’s judgement highlights how effective a purposive approach towards the 
common law can be when it comes to the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms. In 
Unison, we also see a good example of how the judiciary can exercise their powers to ensure 
that the State has appropriate legal mechanisms in place to protect workers’ rights. The 
protection, and development, of common law constitutional rights will become increasingly 
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important in a post-Brexit UK, particularly if the Government imposes deregulatory measures 
in relation to pre-existing EU law.  
Lord Reed’s purposive use of the common law allowed him to stress the fundamental 
importance of the traditional paradigmatic labour law goal of redressing the power imbalance 
in the employment relationship. This opened an argumentative pathway for Lord Reed to hold 
that labour laws must be accessible and enforceable in order to achieve this goal. In addition, 
his judgement laid some grounding for the Supreme Court to assert itself as a court of 
Constitutional jurisdiction. 
As described earlier in this thesis, dynamic legal interpretation is a key component of the 
purposive model advocated. This method of interpretation will be explored in fuller detail with 
reference to Dworkin’s writing and the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilham. 
3.3- Dynamic legal interpretation - statutory interpretation 
3.3.1 - Dynamic legal interpretation - the statutory context 
As Barak has noted, “purposive interpretation...is also based on dynamic interpretation. 
Dynamic interpretation addresses the problem of time...”240 By referring to the problem of 
“time” Barak means that the dynamic approach to interpretation avoids “freezing” the statute’s 
meaning at the point of its enactment.241 By contrast, the dynamic approach recognises that the 
meaning of a legal text, typically a statute, will alter with time.242 Barak makes a valid point 
here. There are a wide range of socio-economic factors which can lead to rapid changes in 
society, such as technological advances and the effects of globalisation. Labour laws must 
adopt a flexible and dynamic approach to keep pace with such changes.  
Dworkin also recognised that dynamic interpretation was necessary243 His imaginary judge, 
Hercules adopts a method of dynamic interpretation: 
“Hercules method...rejects the assumption of a canonical moment at which a statute is born and 
has all and only the meaning it will ever have. Hercules interprets not just the statute’s text but 
its life, the process that begins before it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment. He 
aims to make the story the best he can of this continuing story, and his interpretation therefore 
changes as the story develops.”244 
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It is suggested that Dworkin’s conception of dynamic interpretation, which is compatible with 
Barak’s, is a fundamental component for the theory of statutory interpretation advocated in this 
thesis. The next case analysis from the Supreme Court, the Gilham case, shows the utility of 
dynamic interpretation in a hard case. It also addresses the interaction between the judge’s 
requirement to respect the purpose of a statute whilst meeting the UK’s international human 
rights obligations. 
3.4 - Gilham - case law example of dynamic interpretation 
3.4.1 Background facts 
The claimant was a district court judge who was appointed to judicial office by the Lord 
Chancellor on 6 February 2006.245 She sat at Warrington County Court. Cost-cutting measures 
around 2010 – 2011, where local courts were closed and their cases transferred to Warrington, 
resulted in an increased volume of cases being heard at the Warrington Couty Court.246 The 
claimant complained to local leadership judges and senior members of Her Majesty’s Courts 
and Tribunal Services about the increased workload which had been placed on the district 
judges, together with concerns related to administrative failures and a lack of appropriate court 
room accommodation for the increased volume of cases.247 She later formalised these concerns 
with a grievance in 2011.248 She later lodged several Employment Tribunal, including a claim 
of “detriments” which she experienced as a result of her making protected disclosures 
(“whistleblowing”).249 The whistleblowing claim was brought under section 47B (1) of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”) which states that a worker has the right “not to 
be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer on 
the ground that the worker has made a protected disclosure.” The claimant contended that her 
complaints, relating to increased workload and administrative deficiencies, were “protected 
disclosures” under section 43A of the 1996 Act.250 She also claimed that she was subjected to 
a course of detriments as a result of her protected disclosures, including being bullied, ignored 
and undermined by her judicial and lay colleagues.251 In addition, she complained of further 
detriments, consisting of delays in investigating her grievance and her concerns being 
ultimately dismissed as a “personal working style choice.”252 The claimant claimed that this 
 
245 Gilham (SC) paragraph 4. 
246 Ibid, paragraph 5. 
247 Ibid, paragraph 5 
248 Ibid, paragraph 5. 
249 Ibid, paragraph 8. 
250 Ibid, paragraph 6. 
251 Ibid, paragraph 7. 
252 Ibid, paragraph 7.  
   
 
 56  
 
course of detriments caused a decline in her mental health and she had to take time off work as 
a result.253 
The claimant claimed at the Employment Tribunal that she had jurisdiction to bring a 
whistleblowing claim under Part IVA of the 1996 Act because she was a worker under section 
230(3)(b) of the 1996 Act.254 However, Counsel for the Ministry of Justice submitted that the 
whistleblowing claim could not continue. The reason given by Counsel was that, whilst 
workers had whistleblowing protections, the claimant was a judge and therefore an office 
holder who could not claim these protections under domestic law.255 The Employment Tribunal 
held, at a preliminary hearing, that the claimant was not a “worker” under section 230(3)(b) of 
the 1996 Act and so could not claim whistleblowing protections under Part IVA of the 1996 
Act.256 After a series of unsuccessful appeals to the EAT and the Court of Appeal on this point, 
the claimant appealed to the Supreme Court. 
3.4.3: Legal issues for the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court had to address three questions in the present case: (1) Was the claimant a 
“worker” within the meaning of section 230(3)(b) of the 1996 Act?257 (2) Was the claimant a 
Crown employee under section 191 of the 1996 Act (this was raised for the first time by the 
claimant in her appeal to the Supreme Court)?258 (3) In the event that the answers to questions 
(1) and (2) were “no,” was the claimant’s exclusion from the whistleblowing provisions in the 
1996 Act a breach of her rights under Article 10 ECHR or under Article 14 ECHR read in 
conjunction with Article 10?259 If her Convention rights were breached, the claimant asserted 
that either section 230(3)(b) or section 191 of the 1996 Acts should be interpreted to bring her 
within the whistleblowing protections of Part IVA of the 1996 Act. 
3.4.4: Summary of Judgement 
Lady Hale gave the only substantive Opinion in this case and the other judges agreed 
unanimously with her Opinion. She held that the claimant was not a worker under section 
230(3)(b) of the 1996 Act (“finding 1”)260 that the claimant was not in Crown employment 
under section 191 of the 1996 Act (“finding 2”)261 and that findings 1 and 2 meant that the 
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claimant could not claim the equivalent whistleblowing protections, under Part IVA of the 1996 
Act, that employees and workers enjoyed.262 The facts of the claimant’s case fell within Article 
10 ECHR, in relation to the right of freedom of expression, as she had been unable to make 
protected disclosures.263 Given that the claimant could not claim equivalent protections as 
employees and workers under the whistleblowing provisions in part IVA of the 1996 Act, she 
had been treated less favourably than employees and workers who wished to make responsible 
protected disclosures within the workplace.264 In addition, the claimant had not been protected 
from the “detriments” arising from making such protected disclosures and she had also been 
denied a remedy before an Employment Tribunal for these detriments.265 Employees and 
workers in the claimant’s circumstances were entitled to such protections and rights and these 
disparities in treatment amounted to a violation of Article 10, read together with Article 14.266 
Being a judge was a “status” under Article 14 and so the claimant could claim protection under 
Article 14 in relation to her right to freedom of expression under Article 10.267 As a result, Lady 
Hale held that the 1996 Act should be read to extend whistleblowing protection to the claimant 
(“finding 3”)268. 
The most powerful invocation of the purposive approach in Gilham related to the remedy 
granted to the claimant. Indeed, Lady Hale saw the question of remedy as “the most difficult 
question in this case.”269 The difficulty was that judges, as officeholders, could not, on the face 
of it, qualify for protection under sections 191 or 230 of the 1996 Act. However, that left the 
claimant without a remedy in circumstances where she had clearly been treated less favourably 
than employees or workers. In addition, despite her status as a district judge, the facts 
established by the Employment Tribunal demonstrated that the claimant had clearly been 
placed in a vulnerable situation in the workplace, had suffered detriments as a result, but had 
no legal remedy available to her. The position was further complicated because neither 
Parliament nor the Executive had applied its mind to the question as to whether judges should 
be granted whistleblowing protections. Despite these difficulties, Lady Hale invokes a highly 
creative method of legal reasoning by invoking a purposive approach which flowed from the 
House of Lords’ decision in the Ghaidan case. 
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The House of Lords held in Ghaidan that section 3 HRA allows the judiciary significant 
interpretative leeway when determining whether domestic legislation could be read and given 
effect in a way that is compatible with ECHR rights.270 The invocation of the Ghaidan test 
therefore allows Lady Hale a wide margin of discretion in her search for a remedy for the 
claimant. As Lady Hale recognises “In Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza it was also established that 
what is “possible” goes well beyond the normal canons of literal and purposive statutory 
construction.”271 It is suggested that, whilst Lady Hale correctly identifies the departure from 
a literal canon of construction, the Ghaidan approach is a purposive approach and this point 
will be expanded upon shortly. 
In the meantime, Lady Hale also quotes, with approval, Lord Nicholls’ statement in the 
Ghaidan case that it was necessary, in the interpretation of section 3 HRA, for courts to 
recognise the “unusual and far-reaching character” of the interpretative obligations.272 She also 
quotes, with approval, Lord Rodger’s test in Ghaidan that the interpretation of the domestic 
statute should “go with the grain of the legislation.”273 
Consequently, Lady Hale goes on to hold that the interpretative obligation laid down by 
Ghaidan results in the conclusion that “(Part IVA of) the Employment Rights Act 1996 should 
be read and given effect so as to extend its whistleblowing protection to the holders of judicial 
office.”274 
Clearly, the Ghaidan test involves a marked departure from the traditional literal canon of 
construction. Indeed, Lord Nicholls stated in Ghaidan that the court can legitimately depart 
from the plain meaning of a statute to give effect to Convention-compliant interpretation: 
“From this the conclusion which seems inescapable is that the mere fact the language under 
consideration is inconsistent with a Convention-compliant meaning does not of itself make a 
Convention-compliant interpretation under section 3 impossible. Section 3 enables language to 
be interpreted restrictively or expansively. But section 3 goes further than this. It is also apt to 
require a court to read in words which change the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to 
make it Convention-compliant. In other words, the intention of Parliament in enacting section 
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3 was that, to an extent bounded only by what is "possible", a court can modify the meaning, 
and hence the effect, of primary and secondary legislation.”275 
However, Lord Nicholls then goes on to qualify this statement by saying that there must be 
some parameters within which the court should operate in its interpretative latitude: 
“Parliament, however, cannot have intended that in the discharge of this extended interpretative 
function the courts should adopt a meaning inconsistent with a fundamental feature of 
legislation. That would be to cross the constitutional boundary section 3 seeks to demarcate 
and preserve. Parliament has retained the right to enact legislation in terms which are not 
Convention-compliant. The meaning imported by application of section 3 must be compatible 
with the underlying thrust of the legislation being construed. Words implied must, in the phrase 
of my noble and learned friend, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, "go with the grain of the legislation 
(my emphasis)”276 
3.4.4 Analysis of the judgement 
This metaphor of “going with the grain” of the legislation seems to mean that, where one of 
those meanings, in the range of possible meanings, is a possible interpretation of the statutory 
wording, and the interpretation is also in broad compliance with the purpose, or “thrust,” of the 
legislation, then section 3 requires that the wording should be given that meaning if that is 
necessary to make the legislation Convention-compliant. So, this approach gives judges a wide 
margin of discretion when deciding whether it is possible to construe the legislation in 
accordance with the ECHR. Consequently, the Ghaidan approach permits an interpretation of 
legislation to comply with the ECHR when it is possible to do so. However, the interpretation 
must still go with the “thrust” of the legislation. Given this requirement of “thrust,” it is clearly 
a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. Indeed, it resembles Barak’s requirement 
(when he endorses this approach) that the interpretation of the statute be in accordance with 
the purpose and within the “semantic boundaries” of the text.277 It is also reflective of this 
thesis’ broader approach to statutory interpretation which, as outlined earlier in this chapter, 
seeks to identify the meaning, within a range of possible meanings, which best expresses the 
purpose of the statute and the underlying legal system. The purposive nature of the Ghaidan 
test also allows the judiciary to take a dynamic approach to legal interpretation, as endorsed by 
Dworkin, when it comes to statutory interpretation. As has already been argued, this is a crucial 
 
275 Ghaidan, paragraph 32. 
276 Ibid, paragraph 32 
277 See n.117 
   
 
 60  
 
component of the purposive approach to labour law as it gives the law a chance to keep pace 
with rapidly changing societal developments.  
As will be very clear by this stage, a major contention of this thesis is that the employment 
relationship is imbued with an inherent power imbalance. As the Gilham case shows, this 
power imbalance can manifest itself in circumstances which extend beyond the employment 
relationship to officeholders. A district judge (despite the considerable protections available to 
an individual in that office) was left in an extremely vulnerable position in the workplace and 
this had a damaging impact on her health, yet she had no apparent legal remedy.  Moreover, as 
Lady Hale recognised, a literal interpretation of the relevant legislation would have denied Ms 
Gilham such a remedy. Indeed, if the literal approach was adopted, the law would have treated 
Ms Gilham less favourably than workers or employees in the same situation. As a result, Lady 
Hale invoked a Dworkinian approach to statutory interpretation, a dynamic mode of 
interpretation, as reflected in the Ghaidan principle, to provide a legal remedy to Ms Gilham. 
This was an appropriate approach for Lady Hale to take: Parliament had conferred a broad 
discretion on judges to interpret national legislation to make it compliant with the Convention. 
Lady Hale therefore exercised her discretion in accordance with her constitutional mandate 
and, in doing so, was able to ensure that the legal system conferred a remedy to which the 
claimant was entitled. In addition, there may be wider ramifications of the Gilham judgement. 
The purposive approach adopted in the Gilham case may have opened a whole new sphere of 
employment rights. As Bowers and Lewis have pointed out, there are other non-contractual 
workers and prospective workers, who will generally be in a more vulnerable situation than 
judicial officeholders, who may be able to benefit from the approach taken in Gilham.278 So, 
once again, the flexibility of the purposive approach might also have the effect of promoting 
wider benefits beyond the immediate case (as it did in Unison) to the entire system of labour 
law.  
It is hoped that the purposive approach in Ghaidan can be put to good use by the judiciary in a 
post-Brexit UK. Even if the Conservative Government reduces workers’ (EU derived) rights 
after Brexit, the hope is that judges will make increased reference to the Ghaidan approach in 
order to secure rights-based outcomes in labour law cases which resonate with the principles 
and jurisprudence of the ECHR. However, the ECHR is obviously not the only international 
instrument, which the UK is party to, which regulates labour rights. There are a broad range of 
international conventions which could prove useful in a post-Brexit UK. The last case study, 
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Hounga, shows how the Supreme Court has been willing to refer to a broader range of 
international instruments in labour law disputes. Hounga also shows how a dynamic and 
flexible approach can, when subsumed within a purposive perspective, be applied to the 
interpretation of the common law to achieve the correct outcome in a hard case. However, 
before moving on to analyse the Hounga case, it is necessary to return to the theories of Barak 
and Dworkin. 
3.5 - Dynamic / flexible legal interpretation – common law interpretation 
3.5.1 - Judges in partnership with the legislature 
Balmer has noted additional similarities (other than those mentioned in this thesis) between 
Dworkin’s and Barak’s models of adjudication.279 The most relevant similarity, for present 
purposes, is that Barak, like Dworkin, “sees the judge in the “creative” role of a “partner” with 
the legislature, interpreting statutes in light of changing circumstances to demonstrate the 
community’s commitment to political morality.”280 This thesis has already highlighted the 
similarities of Barak and Dworkin’s approach to dynamic statutory interpretation. This concept 
of a judicial “partnership” with the legislature is related to dynamic interpretation because both 
take account of changing societal circumstances. This is a necessary component of the 
purposive approach to labour law that is being advocated in this thesis.  
It is suggested that the broader theme arising from Barak and Dworkin’s theories, of taking 
societal changes into account when interpreting the law, can, and should, be extended to 
common law interpretation as part of a broader purposive approach. Judges should interpret 
the common law to reflect such changes. Indeed, they must do this in the context of labour law, 
or the law will fall even further behind the constantly changing nature of working patterns. To 
recap on the contextual purposive approach, in its relation to common law interpretation, it 
sometimes requires that the judge must apply a precedent, rule or principle which is not the 
most obvious one to apply to the circumstances of the case. It must, of course, be relevant and 
cohere with the broader legal system, but it need not be the most obvious, or apparent, choice. 
Why should this be so? This will often take place where there is a clash between separate, 
competing purposes in the laws which intersect in legal cases. What must the judge do in such 
cases of conflict? It will be necessary for the judge to resort back to the contextual use of 
weighted legal principles, which underly the precedents (or rules), to resolve the conflict. She 
must pick the most morally attractive principle, or set of principles, to resolve the case, even 
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when such principles are not the most obvious ones. This is necessary because the purpose of 
the law has, as a result of changes in society, trumped the purpose of what appears to be the 
most obvious precedent or rule. This is what happened in the Hounga case which will now be 
analysed. 
3.6 Hounga - case law example of flexible legal interpretation 
3.6.1 - Background facts 
Miss Hounga, (hereinafter referred to as “the claimant,” as was her status at the Employment 
Tribunal), was a Nigerian national with learning difficulties.281 When she was aged around 14, 
Mrs Allen, the respondent (to the Employment Tribunal proceedings), offered the claimant a 
job at her home in England.282 She told the claimant that she would be paid £50 per week and 
receive education in England if she lived in the respondent’s home and looked after her 
children.283 The claimant agreed to these terms.284 The respondent and certain members of her 
family arranged for a false identity for the claimant.285 They also arranged an affidavit for the 
claimant to swear by which stated that she was 20 years old and that her surname was that of 
the respondent’s mother.286 As a result of these misrepresentations, the claimant obtained a 
Nigerian passport with the false name and age.287 The respondent, and her family, took the 
claimant to the British High Commission in Lagos and produced a document stating that the 
respondent’s mother was the claimant’s grandmother and that she had invited her to stay at her 
home in England.288 Consequently, the claimant was granted permission to travel to England.289 
The claimant told the authorities at Heathrow Airport that she was visiting England to visit her 
grandmother and she thereby obtained a six-month visitor’ VISA.290 
The claimant started work at the respondent’s home in January 2007.291 She worked as an au 
pair of sorts, looking after the respondent’s children and doing housework.292 The claimant’s 
liberty was restricted to a significant extent by the respondent; she could only go out with the 
family home under the respondent’s supervision.293 The respondent reneged on her 
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commitments to the claimant: she did not pay her any wages, nor did she provide educational 
opportunities for the claimant.294 The claimant also described a prolonged period of physical 
and emotional abuse by the respondent. She claimed that the respondent physically assaulted 
her on a regular basis and made various threats against her.295 One persistent threat made by 
the respondent to the claimant was that, if she left the respondent’s home, she would be sent to 
prison as her stay in the UK was illegal.296 On 17 July 2008, the respondent physically assaulted 
the claimant, ejected her from her home and threw water over her.297 The claimant slept 
overnight in the respondent’s garden and was thereafter taken into the care of social services.298 
3.6.2 Appellate history 
The claimant lodged Employment Tribunal claims against the respondent for unfair dismissal, 
breach of contract, unpaid wages, unpaid holiday pay and race discrimination.299 The Tribunal 
accepted the claimant’s race discrimination claim, and she was awarded £6,187 for “injury to 
feelings.”300 The other claims were dismissed by the Tribunal, on the grounds that the 
claimant’s contract was tainted with illegality and due to non-compliance with the statutory 
grievance procedures in force at that time under section 4 of the Employment Act 2002.301 The 
respondent appealed to the EAT which upheld the claimant’s race discrimination claim.302 On 
further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the discrimination claims could not succeed 
because the discriminatory treatment complained of was inextricably linked with her own 
illegal action and, if the court was to accept her discrimination claim, it would be tantamount 
to condoning the illegality.303 The court was not prepared to do that.304 The claimant appealed 
the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Supreme Court. The basis for her appeal was that the 
respondent had, by dismissing her from her employment on 17 July 2008, discriminated against 
her on racial grounds, specifically on the grounds of her nationality. 
3.6.3 - Summary of the judgement 
The legal principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio, commonly known as “the illegality 
defence,” prevents the pursuit of a civil claim if the claim arises from the illegal conduct of the 
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claimant.305 In the context of labour law, the illegality defence generally operates to bar claims 
which are based on an illegal contract of employment - so a claim for unfair dismissal cannot 
be based on an illegal contract of employment.306 However, discrimination claims are not 
contractual claims; they are statutory torts.307 Consequently, there was scope for the claimant 
to argue that torts were not barred by the illegality of the contract of employment. The Hounga 
therefore case posed the following question: could an employee claim for race discrimination, 
stemming from her dismissal, even though her employment arose from her own illegal actions? 
This was a classic hard case for the Supreme Court. Prior to Hounga, the law was not clear on 
when the illegality defence would defeat a statutory tort claim. As Lord Wilson, who gave the 
leading speech for the majority, put it: “...although it has...become established that the 
(illegality) defence will sometimes defeat an action in tort, the circumstances in which it will 
do so have never been fully settled.”308 Whilst the law was not “fully settled,” the precedent 
cases that did exist outlined two judicial tests, formulated by the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords, which related to the illegality defence. They were the “reliance”309 and the 
“inextricable link”310 tests. Under the reliance test, the claimant’s claim could not proceed if it 
relied on her illegal actions.311 The inextricable link test states that the claimant cannot pursue 
a claim if it is inextricably linked with her illegal actions.312 The House of Lords had confirmed 
in a previous decision that the reliance test was the correct one to use when considering the 
illegality defence.313 In addition, the Court of Appeal had repeatedly confirmed that the 
“inextricable link” test, which overlapped with the reliance test, should also be used in the 
context of the illegality defence.314 So, these two tests seemed to be the obvious ones for Lord 
Wilson to apply in this case. 
However, Lord Wilson refused to apply either of these tests.315 He reasoned that, given the 
inherent power imbalance in the relationship between the claimant and the respondent, the 
illegal acts of the claimant served no more than a “context” within an abusive and highly 
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controlling relationship.316 He then goes on to describe how the illegality defence “rests on the 
foundation of public policy.”317 Consequently, he poses the following question:  
“So, it is necessary first to ask, “What is the aspect of public policy which founds the defence?” 
and second, to ask “But is there another aspect of public policy to which application of the 
defence would run counter?”318 
Immediately after introducing the public policy test, he refers to the Canadian Supreme Court 
case of Hall v Herbert [1993] 2 SCR 159. He quotes the words of Lachlin, J at p.169 in this 
case, in relation to the power to bar tort claims based on the illegality defence, with approval: 
“The basis of this power, as I see it, lies in [the] duty of the courts to preserve the integrity of 
the legal system, and is exercisable only where this concern is in issue. The concern is in issue 
where a damage(s) award in a civil suit would, in effect, allow a person to profit from illegal 
or wrongful conduct, or would permit an evasion or rebate of a penalty prescribed by the 
criminal law. The idea common to these instances is that the law refused to give by its right 
hand when it takes away by its left hand.”319 
Lord Wilson then goes on to examine the UK’s international obligations. He refers to the 
United Nations (“UN”) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (“the 
Palermo Protocol”) which was ratified by the UK on 9 February 2006. Having reviewed the 
terms of the Palermo Protocol, he then states that “it is hard to resist the conclusion that Mrs 
Allen was guilty of trafficking within the meaning of the definition in the Palermo Protocol.”320 
He also correctly states that, even if the claimant was not, technically, a victim of trafficking, 
she was a victim of forced labour under Article 4 ECHR.321 
Lord Wilson then conducts a review of the UK’s international obligations in relation to the 
prohibition on human trafficking. He refers to the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
Against Trafficking in Human Beings CETS No 197 (“the Anti-Trafficking Convention”). The 
UK became obliged to follow the Anti-Trafficking Convention, under international law, on 1 
April 2009. The Anti-Trafficking Convention duplicates the definition of trafficking from the 
Palermo Protocol. Lord Wilson quotes Article 15 of the Anti-Trafficking Convention: 
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“Each party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right of victims to compensation from the 
perpetrators.” 
He then goes on to state that: 
“It is too technical an approach to an international instrument to contend that paragraph 3 
relates to compensation only for the trafficking and not for related acts of discrimination. In 
my view it would be a breach of the UK’s international obligations under the Convention for 
its law to cause Ms Hounga’s complaint to be defeated by the defence of illegality.”322 
Lord Wilson concludes his judgement by stating that: 
“...the decision of the Court of Appeal to uphold Mrs Allen’s defence of illegality to her 
complaint runs strikingly counter to the prominent strain of current public policy against 
trafficking and in favour of the protection of its victims. The public policy in support of the 
application of that defence, to the extent that it exists at all, should give way to the public policy 
to which its application is an affront; and Miss Hounga’s appeal should be allowed.”323 
3.6.4 - Analysis of the judgement 
Despite his references to “public policy”, what Lord Wilson is doing in the Hounga case is 
weighing the purposes of the illegality defence against the purposes of the anti-trafficking 
provisions. Indeed, he looked at the purpose of the illegality principle and decided that it would 
not be met by refusing the claim given the extreme power imbalance in the employment 
relationship and the fact that the claimant’s illegality was minor when compared with the 
respondent’s actions. He did this by referring to a legal principle, “the integrity of the legal 
system,” to show that the purposes of the illegality defence were not met in this case. Indeed, 
Lord Wilson viewed this principle as requiring that the law should not, and should not be seen 
to, condone acts of illegality when to do so would compromise the integrity of the legal system. 
However, he does not appear to view the claimant’s criminal conduct as sufficiently serious to 
undermine the integrity of the legal system. By referring to her conduct as being within the 
“context” of the factual matrix of the claim, he suggests that there are more serious issues to 
consider than the claimant’s acts of illegality. Those serious issues are the fact that the claimant  
is likely a victim of human trafficking and / or forced labour. 
As a result, there is a conflict of purposes which Lord Wilson had to weigh. He did weigh them, 
and the purpose of the illegality defence was “trumped” by the fact that the claimant had been 
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a victim of human trafficking and / or forced labour. As Lord Wilson observed, the prohibition 
of these practices had become an increasingly pressing concern for the international community 
in recent years and this concern overrode any minor concerns about the claimant’s role in the 
illegality of the contract.324 By weighing the purposes of the laws, Lord Wilson also, by 
necessity, weighed the relevant legal principles in Hounga. At the level of principles, the 
“integrity of the legal system” is a principle which, for Lord Wilson, clearly outweighed the 
“reliance” and “inextricably linked” principles. Indeed, this weighing of principles gave Lord 
Wilson the necessary argumentative pathway to allow the prohibition of trafficking to take a 
more prominent role in the determination of the decision than the illegality defence. In this 
regard, Lord Wilson’s reasoning is also supported by the Dworkinian theory of integrity which 
demands that principles may, over time, be developed to reflect the changing standards of the 
community at large: 
“Integrity demands that the public standards of the community be both made and seen, so far 
as this is possible, to express a single, coherent scheme of justice and fairness in the right 
relation. An institution that accepts that ideal will sometimes, for that reason, depart from a 
narrow line of past decisions in search of fidelity to principles conceived as more fundamental 
to the scheme as a whole.”325 
Indeed, the re-casting of principles was likely to have been seen by Lord Wilson as necessary 
given the community’s (national and international) strong emphasis on the prohibition of 
human trafficking and forced labour.326 It was therefore necessary for Lord Wilson to depart 
from the most obvious precedents in this case – if he had applied them, a literal application of 
the illegality defence would probably have barred the claimant’s claim. 
There are strong elements of purposive reasoning throughout Lord Wilson’s judgement. He 
departed from the most obvious line of precedents, as referred to in the contextual purposive 
approach advocated by this thesis, to prevent the technical application of the illegality defence. 
In addition, he took a broader view of the factual circumstances than the Court of Appeal and 
correctly viewed the claimant’s acts of illegality within the context of an abusive and 
exploitative relationship which had a gross power imbalance. That broader position was 
supported by the facts of the case, as outlined above. As described, he also balanced competing 
purposes during his judgement. Lord Wilson also adopts a purposive approach to the claimant’s 
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remedy: he states that, even though Article 15 of the Anti-Trafficking Convention makes no 
explicit reference to compensation from acts of discrimination arising from trafficking, it would 
be unduly technical to deny the claimant a remedy based on the literal wording of Article 15.  
Consequently, the flexibility of the purposive approach to judicial interpretation advocated in 
this thesis, which aligns with Dworkin’s requirement that the judge can depart from a strict line 
of precedent and resort to more fundamental legal principles when societal circumstances 
dictate, ensured that the claimant received an appropriate legal remedy for the discrimination 
which she was subjected to whilst also adhering to the community’s pressing commitment to 
outlaw human trafficking. 
Hounga is also relevant because it involves the purposive application of non-EU-derived legal 
sources. Indeed, the case demonstrates that there will still be a vast array of legal tools open to 
the judiciary, which do not derive from EU law, after 31 December 2020. Lord Wilson’s 
decision makes ample reference to the UN-derived Palermo Protocol which was ratified by the 
UK on 9 February 2006. He also refers to the Council of Europe’s “Anti-Trafficking 
Convention” in some detail. He also referred to Article 4 ECHR when he decided that, even if 
Ms Hounga was not a victim of trafficking, she was certainly a victim of forced labour.327 The 
UK will continue to be a member of the UN after Brexit has taken place. It will also remain a 
member of the Council of Europe. This is significant because the Anti-Trafficking Convention 
and the ECHR are derived from the Council of Europe, not from EU law. The Palermo Protocol 
is derived from the UN. Another important point, raised by Lord Hughes in Hounga, is that 
English courts are obliged to interpret open questions in the common law in accordance with 
the UK’s international obligations, even when the UK is not a party to the international 
instrument being relied upon. This leaves greater room for interpretative leeway when one 
considers the broad range of treaties which the UK is not party to. It should therefore be a 
reminder to judges that these international instruments can be directly applied, in a purposive 
manner, to labour law cases to potentially mitigate the adverse effects of labour law 
deregulation. 
3.7 - Conclusion 
The model now has 8 components and is complete. The application of these components has 
been demonstrated in labour law decisions of the Supreme Court. To reinforce the utility of the 
purposive model to UK labour law, the final challenge of the thesis is to demonstrate how the 
model can be applied by the judge in a prospective fashion to a case which has not been decided 
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at the time of writing. The case that has been chosen is the pending UK Supreme Court decision 
in Uber. This case has been chosen because it is a hard case, involving many of the challenges 
which labour law faces today, and due to its potentially profound implications both for the 
“gig” economy and UK labour law. 
 
Chapter 4 – purposive interpretation – Uber v Aslam 
4.1 Background facts 
Several London-based Uber drivers lodged ET claims, under the Employment Rights Act 1996 
(1996 Act), read with the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (NMWA) and associated 
regulations, for national minimum wage payments and paid annual leave under the WTR. The 
drivers brought the claims on the basis that they were “workers” under s.230(3)(b) of the 1996 
Act, section 54(3)(b) of the NMWA and Regulation 2(1) of the WTR.328 Uber’s defence was 
that the drivers were self-employed independent contractors and therefore not entitled to these 
payments.329 This analysis will focus on the “employment status” aspect of the Court of 
Appeal’s judgement as this is most relevant to the scope of the enquiry. 
Uber comprises multiple corporate entities. UL Limited  (ULL), based in London, holds the 
company’s private hire license.330 UBV, a Dutch company, is the parent company of ULL and 
owns intellectual property rights in the app.331 Uber’s position is that its drivers are self-
employed businesses and that ULL acts as an agent for the drivers by allowing passengers to 
book fares using its app technology.332 Accordingly, Uber’s position is that ULL acts as a 
technology provider and does not provide transportation services: transportation services are 
provided by the drivers under contracts between the drivers and passengers.333 As a result, all 
written contracts were between the drivers and UBV for the use of the app, not with ULL. 
Drivers own their own vehicles, but these vehicles must conform with specific requirements 
laid down by Uber.334 They are deemed available to work when they log onto the app.335 
Potential passengers use the app to book fares. The app then tracks the closest available driver 
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to the potential passenger and offers her the opportunity to accept the trip.336 The driver has ten 
seconds to accept the trip. If there is no acceptance within that timeframe, the app will 
automatically track another driver.337 A driver’s failure to accept bookings can result in her 
being suspended or blocked from using the app, thereby depriving her of the ability to work.338 
When a driver accepts a booking, the app will generate a route for the journey; the driver is 
expected to adhere to this route unless the passenger expresses preference for an alternative 
route.339 Uber calculates the fare for the trip and takes an approximate 20 percent charge from 
each fare.340 UBV then generates an “invoice” for the passenger but the passenger does not 
receive it.341 
The drivers’ relationship with UBV was set out in a complex and convoluted series of 
contractual documents. The 2013 contracts, titled “Partner Agreements” denied that Uber was 
a transportation provider.342 These documents attempted to place an intermediary between 
Uber and the driver – the “Partner” - who was responsible for the transportation services and 
fully liable for the acts or omissions of the driver, and the “Driver” who was defined 
separately.343 Of course, the Partner and the Driver were the same person in virtually every 
case.344 The passenger was designated as the “Customer.”345 The 2013 terms stipulated that the 
contract for transportation services was between the Partner and the Customer.346 In addition, 
the 2013 terms obliged the driver to comply with the quality standards set by Uber, and failure 
to adhere to these standards could result in the driver’s termination by Uber.347 They also 
entitled Uber to deduct charges for each fare from the driver,348 set down quality standards for 
the vehicles the drivers used,349 terminate the driver’s use of the app in the event of customer 
complaints and constantly monitor the driver’s activities.350 
The 2013 terms were replaced with new terms in 2015. Uber did not consult with the drivers 
regarding the content of the new terms. They were sent to the drivers via the app and had to be 
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accepted before the drivers could continue to work for Uber.351 The 2015 terms kept the 
essential Uber model, described above, intact but re-labelled the parties to various contracts. 
The “Partner” was designated as the “Customer” and the “Customer” became the “User.” The 
“Customer” then became the intermediary for the “Driver” despite them being one-and-the-
same person and this agreement had to be sent to Uber.352 The “Customer” (driver) had to then 
accept sole responsibility for the acts and omissions of its “Driver.”353 The addendum 
agreement then re-defines the “Customer” as the “Transportation Provider” and requires the 
Transportation Provider (driver) to enter a contract with the “Driver” regarding the terms of 
Uber’s services.354  
The 2015 terms did not contain any contractual relationships between the driver and ULL; 
terms being “agreed” between the driver and UBV.355 They also required the driver to agree 
that Uber was not a transportation provider in any capacity whatsoever.356 In addition, the 2015 
terms outlined a performance management procedure whereby Uber would notify the Customer 
(driver) if the driver’s “Minimum Average Rating” (passengers can rate their driver experience 
on the app) falls below a certain average score. The driver then has a limited time-period to 
improve his average score, failing which he will be deactivated from the Uber app (and 
therefore unable to continue working for Uber).357 The terms did not allow the Customer / 
Transportation Provider / driver to send a substitute driver.358 Uber also required the driver to 
accept 80% of bookings (or risk being deactivated from the app),359 conducted interviews to 
assess the suitability of prospective drivers,360 specified the make and model of cars the drivers 
had to use361 and prohibited the drivers from exchanging contact details with passengers.362 
The ET held, inter alia, that the drivers were employed by ULL as “workers” under section 
230(3)(b) of the 1996 Act.363 Uber’s appeal to the EAT was rejected.  The EAT refused Uber’s 
attempt to “leapfrog” an application to the Supreme Court but granted its appeal to the Court 
of Appeal.364 
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4.2 - Court of Appeal – the majority decision 
The basis for Uber’s ground of appeal, in relation to the employment status aspect of the case, 
continued to be that the drivers were self-employed businesses, not workers. The Court of 
Appeal, by a 2:1 majority (Bean LJ, Sir Terence Etherton MR, Underhill LJ dissenting) 
dismissed the appeal, holding, inter alia, that ULL employed the drivers as workers under 
section 230(3)(b) of the 1996 Act.365 The majority’s position was based primarily on the facts 
that only ULL (i) could accept or decline bookings for drivers, (ii) interviewed and recruited 
the drivers; (iii) exercised a high degree of control over the drivers via the threat of deactivation 
of the app unless the driver adhered to Uber’s stringent requirements; (iv)  retained the 
passenger’s personal details and d id not allow those details to be released to the driver; (v) 
fixed the fare and the driver could not subsequently negotiate a higher amount; (vi) specified 
the make and model of cars that drivers could use; (vii) subjected its drivers to a system of 
performance management; (viii) dealt with refunds to passengers without needing to consult 
with the driver; (ix) handled complaints about the drivers; and (x) reserved the power to 
unilaterally amend the driver’s terms and conditions.366 
Unsurprisingly, the majority viewed the contractual arrangements between the parties, as 
described above, as involving a high level of artificiality and went on to outline several 
“fictions” in the contracts.367 In particular, the majority found that the relative absence of ULL 
from the contracts was dubious given its high degree of control over the drivers.368 They also 
found that there could be no contract between the driver and the passenger before pickup 
because fundamental components of the contract, such as the fare and the destination, were 
unknown to the driver.369 In addition, the insertion of an intermediary, the Partner (2013) or 
Customer (2015), was seen by the majority as an artificial construct given that the driver and 
Partner / Customer were almost always the same person.370 They also observed that ULL was 
the resident company in London which had to fulfil the statutory requirement of being a “fit 
and proper person” to hold a private hire license in London.371 For ULL to be doing so whilst 
simultaneously claiming to be an affiliate of UBV which licensed thousands of separate 
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businesses “contributes to the air of contrivance and artificiality which pervades Uber's 
case.”372  
The majority also considered the application of Autoclenz to the circumstances of the case. 
They noted Lord Clarke’s recommendation in Autoclenz for courts to be “realistic and worldly 
wise” when determining whether contractual terms accurately depicted the reality of the 
working relationship between the parties.373 Accordingly, the majority viewed Autoclenz as 
allowing the Court: 
“to disregard the terms of any contract created by the employer in so far as it seeks to 
characterise the relationship between the employer and the individuals who provide it with 
services (whether employees or workers) in a particular artificial way. Otherwise, employers 
would simply be able to evade the consequences of Autoclenz by the creation of more elaborate 
contrivances involving third parties.”374  
The majority also stated that such artificiality could be readily identified by the “reasonable 
person” who will be able to assess the reality, or otherwise, of the working relationship between 
Uber and its drivers, despite the existence of convoluted and confusing contractual terms.375 
They stressed that, whilst the worker’s signature was a relevant factor to consider when 
determining employment status, it was not a determinative factor given the inequality of 
bargaining power in the employment relationship, coupled with the increasing use of drafting 
techniques by employers, and their advisors, which sought to evade the employer’s obligations 
under the employment relationship.376  
This thesis agrees with the majority’s conclusions which sit well with the purposive approach 
advocated in this thesis. The reported factual background of the case clearly reveals that ULL 
exercised a high degree of control over the drivers. The most prominent examples of control 
were the performance management procedures, the persistent threat of deactivation from the 
app, fixing passenger fares and specifying the vehicles which the drivers could use. These 
elements of control militate against a finding that the workers were self-employed independent 
contractors.377 Moreover, the majority’s decision astutely observed that Uber’s case was 
infused with fictions. The insertion of intermediary terms, the Partner and the Customer, was 
particularly problematic for Uber as they created a counterintuitive, unrealistic depiction of the 
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real working arrangements. As will be argued below, the majority took the necessary measure 
of taking a purposive approach to the circumstances, as advocated in this thesis, recognising 
that the protective purposes of the statute had to prevail over the contractual wording.  
4.3 The minority view 
Underhill LJ’s Opinion stated that Autoclenz could not be applied to the facts in Uber.378 
Indeed, he viewed Autoclenz as allowing a departure from the contractual wording only when 
the working arrangements on the ground did not reflect the content of the contractual terms.379 
This was highly relevant for Underhill LJ as he identified a general congruence between the 
contractual wording and the reality of the working relationship in Uber.380 Moreover, he failed 
to see any artificiality in the contractual documents described above: they reflected a mini-cab 
model of operation that had been operating in London for decades. 
Given the congruence between the contractual terms and the reality of the working relationship, 
Underhill LJ’s position was that the court could not depart from the contractual wording.381 
Indeed, he interpreted the contractual wording in a strict, literal fashion and held that the drivers 
were self-employed.382 He recognised that the employment relationship was infused with an 
inequality of bargaining power, which often leads to disadvantageous contractual terms for 
workers, but stated that that fact did not allow the court to re-write the contracts.383 Instead, he 
saw this as a policy matter more appropriate for the legislature to act upon than the judiciary.384 
There are various problems with Underhill LJ’s Opinion. His main mistake was to adopt an 
unduly narrow interpretation of the Autoclenz judgement. This will be revisited. In the 
meantime, there are some other obvious flaws in his reasoning which cannot be ignored. For 
instance, he maintained that the drivers were self-employed whilst also recognising that Uber 
interviews and recruits' drivers,385 and whilst at the same time finding that Uber exercised a 
high degree of control over its drivers, including the imposition of performance management 
procedures and dictation of vehicle specifications to drivers.386 In addition, he saw nothing 
artificial regarding Uber’s practice of preparing an invoice to a passenger who never receives 
it.387 Surprisingly, he does not, in contrast to the ET, the EAT and the majority of the Court of 
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Appeal, appear to see anything artificial in any of Uber’s contractual arrangements and rebuts 
all the ET’s initial findings in fact in this respect.388 He justifies these findings by explaining 
that they resemble models used by other private hire providers whilst also conceding that he 
has not assessed whether the Uber model is, or ever has been, “on-all-fours" with other taxi 
models.389  
4.4 - Main differences between the majority and minority opinions 
Underhill LJ’s Opinion stems from his rigid adherence to the sanctity of contract390 whilst the 
majority took a broader purposive approach which focused on the protective purposes of the 
statute. This sharp distinction between the majority and minority has been well illustrated by 
Bogg and Ford.391 As they correctly observe, whilst the majority and the minority both saw 
Autoclenz as requiring an inquiry into the true agreement between the contracting parties, this 
mandate drew them in different directions. For this reason, they designate Underhill LJ’s strict 
contractual approach as “contractual Autoclenz” and the majority’s broader approach as 
“statutory Autoclenz.”392 For Underhill LJ, Autoclenz was given a contractual interpretation 
because “the written terms provided the reality of the agreement, only to be disregarded when 
inconsistent with practice.”393 On the other hand, the majority, when interpreting the scope of 
Autoclenz, placed more emphasis on the factual arrangements and the protective purposes of 
the statute conferring employment status.394 This was in line with a broader purposive approach 
that the authors recommended and which the courts have taken in a series of tax and landlord 
and tenancy cases.395  
4.5 Uber in the Supreme Court 
4.5.1 Summary of the parties’ submissions to the Supreme Court  
Uber’s appeal to the Supreme Court, in relation to the employment status aspects of the appeal, 
remains that the drivers are self-employed businesses rather than workers. Uber’s case is 
essentially a repetition of Underhill LJ’s judgement in the Court of Appeal. Indeed, Counsel 
for Uber, Dinah Rose QC, summarised her submissions, at their outset, as an endorsement of 
Underhill LJ’s judgement in the Court of Appeal. Consequently, she stressed in her 
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submissions to the Supreme Court that the contractual wording must always be the starting 
point for the court when it is required to determine “limb b” status. She submitted that the 
contractual wording is the correct lens for the court to assess the true nature of the agreement 
between the parties. As a result, her overarching submission is, in its essence, based squarely 
on the sanctity of contract. In this respect, her submissions embrace the “contractual 
Autoclenz” model.  
By contrast, Counsel for two of the drivers, James Galbraith-Martin QC, argued in favour of 
the “statutory Autoclenz” approach in his submissions. The thrust of his submissions was that 
the contractual documentation between Uber and the drivers did not capture the reality of the 
working arrangements. Accordingly, his position was that the court must determine 
employment status with the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions as the defining lens, 
not the labels characterised by the employer in contracts. His submissions stress the need for a 
purposive approach given the inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship, 
which results in workers having little-to-no say in the (sometimes fictitious and evasive) 
contractual terms which are imposed upon them. Accordingly, he cites cases from landlord and 
tenancy law to support this proposition, including the purposive approach adopted by the House 
of Lords in Street v Mountford396 which was, as outlined earlier in this thesis, endorsed by Lord 
Clarke in Autoclenz. Counsel for the other drivers, Gerald Segal QC, goes even further in his 
endorsement of the purposive approach and specifically refers to Bogg and Ford’s approach 
which favours the statutory approach to Autoclenz over the contractual reading. Accordingly, 
he also explicitly agrees with the authors’ recommendation for the Court to follow the 
purposive approach, adopted in other areas of the law, in order to decide the Uber case. 
Consequently, Segal refers, with approval, to the purposive approach taken by the Court of 
Appeal in the tenancy case of Bankway which was again approved by Lord Clarke in Autoclenz. 
He also refers to the tax case of WT Ramsay v Inland Revenue Commissioners397 where the 
House of Lords adopted a purposive approach to nullify a convoluted and highly artificial tax 
avoidance scheme. Segal submits that the purposive approach adopted in cases such as these 
applies equally to the Uber case: the protective purposes of the statute conferring employment 
status should restrict the parties’ freedom to contract where the contractual wording itself is 
artificial. 
4.5.2 A Purposive Approach to Uber  
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It would be disappointing if the Supreme Court preferred the “contractual Autoclenz” approach 
over the “statutory Autoclenz” approach. A predominant focus on the contractual wording 
ignores the fact that the creation of contractual terms and conditions in labour law is typically 
imbued with an inequality in bargaining power. This can allow employers to insert fictitious 
clauses into contracts, and the worker has no means to negotiate with the employer on such 
terms. Moreover, the incredibly strict emphasis on the contractual wording, argued for by Uber 
in their Supreme Court submissions, places an unduly onerous burden on claimants who wish 
to establish that they are workers under the relevant legislation. In this respect, it does not sit 
well with the inclusive purposes of the legislation which were described earlier in this thesis. 
It also makes it easier for employers, and their advisers, to evade their responsibilities towards 
their workers by continually re-wording, and re-contextualising, the contractual documents. In 
addition, there is an underlying strain in the logic of Underhill LJ’s judgement which is 
encapsulated well by Fredman and Du Toit: 
“By the same reasoning (as Underhill LJ used in Uber), it would seem, a shop assistant serving 
customers of the business where she works could be deemed to be entering into a private 
contract with each "direct beneficiary' whom she serves, without being a worker or employee 
of the business on which she is dependent and the services of which she is marketing as an 
"integral part' of its operation, if that is what her contract with the business says.” 
This strain is relevant because, as previously highlighted, Uber’s submissions to the Supreme 
Court amount to an endorsement of Underhill LJ’s approach. 
It is suggested that the Supreme Court should follow the reasoning of the majority in the Court 
of Appeal. The majority took a broader, purposive approach to the case. They stressed the 
fundamental importance of the statutory wording conferring worker status and , as a result, they 
interpreted the contractual wording with the statute’s protective and inclusive provisions at the 
forefront of their thinking. Staying with Bogg and Ford’s terminology, for the sake of brevity 
and clarity, this thesis therefore takes the view that “statutory Autoclenz” was adopted by the 
majority and is a superior approach to “contractual Autoclenz.” The statutory approach reflects 
the purposive approach advocated in this thesis. It does so by prioritising the protective 
provisions of the statute over the wording in the contract. In doing so, the statute’s purpose is 
at the forefront of the judge’s reasoning process, as it should be. Indeed, as described in section 
2.5.3, the purpose of introducing the intermediate category of “worker” was to broaden the 
scope of certain employment rights to a wider category of individuals. As Bogg and Ford 
observe, it would be unfortunate if that purpose was to be frustrated by a series of “labyrinthine 
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written contracts.”398 In addition to complying with the purposes of the statute, the “statutory 
Autoclenz” approach also avoids the difficulties, outlined in section 2.5.3 and this chapter, 
which a strict adherence to contract necessarily entails.  
Having taken a position on which approach the Supreme Court should adopt, this thesis will 
now go on to consider how the purposive model, built in this thesis, should be applied to the 
circumstances in Uber. 
4.5.3 The purposive model applied to Uber 
The model built in this thesis allows two separate argumentative pathways, focused on the 
purposive approach, which both reach the same finding: that the Uber drivers are workers. If 
the Supreme Court is to decide the issue of worker status in accordance with the purposive 
approach advocated in this thesis, and it is submitted that it should, then the first pathway for 
the Court would be to simply use Bogg’s presumption of worker status and assess whether 
Uber can show clear evidence to the contrary. This is the simpler of the two pathways. The 
other pathway involves a combination of several of the model’s components. Bogg’s simpler 
approach will be considered first. 
4.5.4. A presumption of worker status 
Bogg’s idea is not a novel proposition. Indeed, section 28(1) of the NMWA already contains a 
rebuttable presumption that an individual engaged in civil proceedings will be assumed to 
qualify for the national minimum wage unless clear evidence to the contrary can be shown by 
the employer. Bogg simply takes this idea one step further and applies it to other claims, such 
as those under the WTR, which workers are entitled to bring in ET proceedings. If the Supreme 
Court is to hold, in line with Bogg’s argument, that Autoclenz created such a presumption, two 
questions would arise. Can Uber show clear evidence that the drivers are self-employed? If the 
answer to the first question is “yes” the next question becomes: how could Uber do this? 
Uber’s position is that the drivers are operating independent businesses and that the passengers 
are the driver’s customers. If this argument is accepted by the Supreme Court, it would negate 
a finding of worker status. However, this argument is very unlikely to succeed. A contract of 
service is governed by general contract law, rather than by specific labour law principles. 
Consequently, Uber’s first problem with this argument is that, on general contractual 
principles, there does not appear to be a contract between the d rivers and the passengers. Uber’s 
position, which seems illogical under general principles of contract law, is that there is a 
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contract between the driver and the passengers in circumstances where the driver does not 
know the destination of the passenger until she has picked up the passenger, does not know the 
identity of the passenger, cannot negotiate a higher fare with the passenger, cannot claw back 
any money from the passenger for damage that the passenger might cause to the vehicle, cannot 
exchange any contact details with the passenger and can have the fare unilaterally deducted by 
Uber, without consultation with the driver, in the event of a complaint by the passenger 
regarding the driver. Viewed in the round, the supposed “contract” between the drivers and 
passengers therefore lacks many of the fundamental features of a contract per se. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court should hold, as a matter of general contractual principles, that there was not 
a contract between the drivers and passengers. 
In addition, the facts, as established by the Employment Tribunal and referred to above, 
strongly point against the conclusion that the drivers were self-employed businesses. The facts 
evidence that ULL had a high degree of control over the drivers, as described earlier in this 
chapter, and that the drivers were integrated into Uber’s business. This points towards worker, 
rather than self-employed, status.399 They also strongly point towards the conclusion that the 
drivers were personally responsible to deliver services to Uber as there was no right of 
substitution in any of the contracts. These factors again indicate worker, rather than self-
employment, status. In addition, the fundamental features of self-employment are missing in 
this case. There is no opportunity for drivers to increase the profitability of their activities: they 
are prohibited by Uber from negotiating higher fares with passengers and from exchanging 
contact details with them again (in the hope of repeat business without Uber acting as the 
referral source). In this respect, the drivers are completely dependent on Uber for the customer 
referrals they receive. They also cannot spread their economic risks across a broad spectrum of 
clients, as is the case with genuinely self-employed individuals. In essence, the drivers in Uber 
were economically dependent and subordinate to Uber. Again, this points away from self-
employed status and towards worker status. Consequently, if the Supreme Court was to apply 
Bogg’s presumption to determine Uber, and it is argued that it should, then it should arrive at 
the conclusion that the drivers were workers. This thesis will now go on to analyse the second 
argumentative pathway facilitated by the purposive model it has built.  
4.5.5 The purposive model in action – Uber 
The second argumentative pathway is based on a combination of several of the theoretical 
components in the purposive model built in this thesis, including the purposive approach, 
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contextual purposive interpretation, a recognition of the inequality of bargaining power in the 
employment relationship and the use of weighted Dworkinian principles. 
The purpose of the legislation should be considered first. The purpose of the national minimum 
wage, under NMWA, is to ensure a fair level of pay and to avoid exploitation of workers. The 
purpose of the right to paid time off, under the WTR, is to ensure that the worker can balance 
her work life with rest and recreational opportunities. Consequently, it is suggested that these 
legislative provisions have protective purposes: to help ameliorate the power imbalance in the 
employment relationship, by conferring basic employment protections, and to thereby assert 
the dignity of the worker. Indeed, these claims are based on basic social rights and Parliament 
legislated to give them a wider application when they introduced the “concept” of worker into 
UK labour law. So, the purposive approach requires the judge to interpret these provisions in 
line with their protective and inclusionary purposes. 
This should lead the judge to engage on what this thesis has labelled contextual purposive 
interpretation which was outlined in section 2.5. Indeed, section 2.5.3 recommended the line 
of reasoning which the judge should adopt, in cases such as Uber, where there is a complex 
and convoluted series of contractual terms, at least some of which are artificial. It is suggested 
that at least some of the contractual terms in the Uber case were undoubtedly artificial. Perhaps 
the most prominent example was the introduction of a clearly fictitious intermediary - the 
Partner (2013) or the Customer (2015) - between the drivers and Uber. As highlighted earlier 
in this thesis, these are obviously one-and-the-same people. The statutory approach to 
Autoclenz, which is advocated in this thesis over the contractual approach, would allow the 
Supreme Court to elevate the protective purposes of the NMWA and WTR over the artificial 
contractual arrangements. Not only has the statutory approach been argued as being the better 
way of dealing with “evasive” employer tactics, but it is also clear that it is the approach which 
Lord Clarke had in mind when he handed down the Court’s judgement in Autoclenz. Indeed, 
as previously mentioned, Lord Clarke referred to the Street v Mountford and Bankway cases, 
with approval, as being legitimate examples of when the court can prioritise the protective 
purposes of the statute over artificial, or fictitious, contractual wording. That is the very essence 
of the “statutory Autoclenz” model which Bogg and Ford recommend. It is, by this point in the 
thesis, also clear from the case-law which has been considered that the Uber drivers satisfied 
the statutory requirement of worker status: ULL exercised a high degree of control over the 
drivers, at points verging on micromanagement, the drivers were engaged in personal service 
with no chance to send a substitute, they had no chance to increase the profitability of their 
activities and were completely dependent on Uber for customer referrals. Consequently, they 
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were clearly workers under the relevant legislation irrespective of whether Bogg’s presumption 
is applied. Given that they satisfy the legislative definition, they should be held by the Supreme 
Court to be workers regardless of the existence of patently artificial and evasive contractual 
terms which try to argue otherwise. 
Aspects of Dworkin’s theory of adjudication also come into play to support the worker finding. 
There is, like Autoclenz, a clash of principles in Uber. The most pronounced clash is between 
the principle of freedom of contract, argued for by Uber and sanctified by Underhill LJ in his 
dissent, and the reality of the situation; a reality which must be understood in the context of the 
principle that there is a stark inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship.  
This inequality is clearly at play in the Uber case. By way of example, the drivers had to accept 
the 2015 terms, unquestioningly, before being allowed to work. Given this inequality of 
bargaining power, and the factors mentioned above, the principle of freedom of contract should 
be outweighed by the reality of the situation, contextualised by the inequality of bargaining 
power between Uber and its drivers. The principle of freedom of contract should be given little-
to-no weight in this case because the contractual terms themselves were, at least in part, 
artificial. In addition, the drivers had no negotiating power in respect of these artificial 
contractual terms. These combined considerations render the principle of “freedom to contract” 
in the Uber case as no more than a sham arrangement which favoured Uber’s interests. 
If the Supreme Court goes on to hold that the drivers are workers, as it should, this finding will 
cohere with the broader legal system. Indeed, the statutory Autoclenz approach fits well with a 
line of tax cases, beginning with the Ramsay case referred to earlier in this Chapter, and with 
the decisions in Street v Mountford, Bankway and, most importantly, in the labour context, 
with Autoclenz itself. 
Consequently, it is suggested that this second argumentative pathway is a good demonstration 
of how the purposive model built in this thesis can allow the judge to reach a decision which 
accords with the reality of the working arrangements which the drivers faced  - they were 
workers, not self-employed independent contractors. If the Court adopts a purposive approach, 
it would therefore be allowing a vulnerable group of workers to re-assert their statutory rights, 
whilst also pointing UK labour law in a more purposive direction which can meet its 
challenges, and align with its underlying goals, in a more effective way than the traditional 
“plain-meaning” or literal approach allows. 
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Chapter 5 – conclusion 
This Thesis has blended a mixture of pessimism and optimism. On the downside, it seems 
likely that the toxic mixture of Brexit and COVID-19, coupled with the Conservative 
Governments’ enthusiasm to deregulate UK Labour Law, will lead to a repeal, or at least 
regressive amendments, of some EU-derived workers’ rights in the UK. This is concerning 
because the EU has been an important source of progressive labour reforms in the UK over the 
last few decades, not to mention the fact that UK labour law has already been in a state of crisis 
for several decades. On the upside, the thesis illustrates how a reconceptualization of the 
judicial approach to labour law might help to mitigate these adverse effects if they come to 
pass. A purposive approach to judicial interpretation has been advocated to assist in this 
prospective exercise.  
As this thesis has demonstrated, the purposive approach to labour law has been gathering pace 
at a judicial level, first in the House of Lords, and now in the UK Supreme Court, for several 
decades. This is highly significant: if there is going to be a more general shift towards a 
purposive approach in UK labour law cases, this will have to be spearheaded at the highest 
judicial level. It is hoped that this shift takes place, but it is hard to gauge at this stage whether 
it will come to pass. A finding by the Supreme Court in favour of the Uber drivers, based on a 
purposive approach, would certainly be a step forward. 
The thesis has progressed on the basis that different areas of law will require their own, 
individuated judicial modes of reasoning. The purposive model of adjudication, advocated in 
this thesis, is specifically tailored to labour law disputes. Cases such as Autoclenz have been 
referred to, and analysed, in order to exemplify the contention that labour law requires a judicial 
approach which departs from the judiciary’s approach in other commercial disputes. The 
principal reason for this differentiation is that labour law is a legal subset where there is 
generally a large gulf in the bargaining power, and more generally the power dynamics, 
between the contracting parties. A review of Kahn-Freund's work was conducted to illustrate 
how the traditional theoretical paradigm in labour law has been to try to ameliorate this power 
imbalance and thereby restore the dignity of the worker. The thesis has sought to highlight that 
this power imbalance is a very real one, involving a cycle of subordination and dependency, 
and that rapid changes to the workforce have had the effect of increasing many workers’ 
subordination and vulnerability in the workplace, particularly in areas such as the gig economy 
and zero hours working. As a result, this thesis has maintained that the traditional paradigm of 
   
 
 83  
 
labour law, to redress the power imbalance in the employment relationship, is more important 
now than ever. This goal is being recognised at the highest judicial level in the UK, as the 
Autoclenz and Unison case analyses demonstrate. 
Two of the most prominent theories on purposive interpretation, those of Davidov and Barak, 
have been analysed and found lacking in several respects. This thesis has attempted, in building 
a new model of purposive interpretation, to rectify the defects identified in Barak and 
Davidov’s theories. With respective to Barak’s theory, it has been shown to be overambitious 
in trying to apply a purposive model across all areas of the law. It fails to take account of the 
need for individual modes of judicial reasoning in different areas of the law. In addition, Barak 
has placed undue emphasis on subjective legislative intention. The model built in this thesis 
rectifies these problems by tailoring the purposive model to one area of law and by re-focusing 
attention on the broader purposes of the statute, as opposed to subjective legislative intention. 
With regard to Davidov’s theory, this thesis has shown how it fails to recognise that the 
problem of inequality of bargaining power is inextricably linked to the problems of workers’ 
subordination and vulnerabilities. Whilst this thesis agrees with some of Davidov’s theoretical 
components, it takes the view that his theory fails to show how the purposive approach can be 
applied to legal cases. The present thesis has utilised case studies, and the application of the 
advocated model to a pending Supreme Court decision, to demonstrate that the purposive 
approach is not just theoretically sound; it is also fit for use by judges in real labour law cases. 
Indeed, as the case analyses have shown, the purposive model advocated in this thesis offers a 
more dynamic and flexible means of judicial interpretation in labour law decisions than the 
traditional literal approach allows. This need for flexibility, and dynamism, is vital given the 
rapid socio-economic changes in UK society and the continually changing nature of the 
workforce. If a more flexible approach is not adopted by the UK judiciary in labour law cases, 
it is likely that labour laws will fall further behind societal developments. Purposive 
interpretation has also been defended from its main critics and justified with reference to case-
law and jurisprudential theory. In doing so, a new model of purposive interpretation, 
specifically tailored to counteract the principal challenges of labour law, has been constructed 
to guide statutory, contractual and common law interpretation in labour law disputes.  
The theory advocated in this thesis allows judges greater flexibility in the interpretation of 
statutes than the literal approach allows. It does so by acknowledging that language is 
indeterminate in its nature and that the judge must, as a result, choose an interpretation from 
within a range of semantic possibilities to best reflect the underlying purposes of the statutory 
provision, and the statute and legal system. The interpretation need not be the most obvious 
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interpretation; it is sufficient that it complies with the boundaries of semantic sensibility and 
that it generally fits within the broader legal system. This method of statutory interpretation is 
well exemplified in the Gilham case study. Similarly, in common law interpretation, the judge 
need not necessarily apply the most obvious rule or precedent to determine the issue: she must 
pick that which best complies with the purpose of the legal system. This may be done by 
weighing legal principles and selecting the most morally attractive principles which apply to 
the circumstances of the case at hand. These principles underlie the relevant legal rules and 
precedents, and their relative weight will determine which rule or precedent should apply to 
the case. Again, the precedent or rule selected must also cohere with the broader legal system, 
otherwise permissible judicial interpretation risks straying into the realm of impermissible 
judicial legislation, but it need not be the most obvious legal interpretation. The requirement to 
combine flexibility with the need for legal certainty is necessary because the common law is a 
living instrument which must move in tandem with societal changes. This need for flexibility 
is exemplified in the Hounga case study. The purposive approach to contractual interpretation, 
advocated in this thesis, recognises that the power imbalance in the employment relationship 
will often lead to situations where contractual documentation is artificially contrived to attempt 
to circumvent the employers’ obligations under the employment relationship. The purposive 
model asks judges to be alive to such possibilities and look to a wide range of extrinsic 
evidence, including the actual practices of the contracting parries, to determine the real nature 
of what the parties agreed. This is well exhibited by the Autoclenz decision. In addition, the 
purposive model recognises that there will be situations where the judge must look to prioritise 
the protective purposes of the statute over the contrived wording of an artificial contract. This 
is the approach which this thesis recommends the Supreme Court should take in the pending 
Uber decision. 
The use of Dworkinian principles by the judiciary is particularly helpful to the purposive 
approach. As demonstrated in several of the case analyses, the contextual nature of such 
principles, and their relative weight, allows the judge ample flexibility in her interpretative 
task. This flexibility allows the judge to reach a legal conclusion which best accords with the 
purposes of the legal text in question and to contextualise her mode of reasoning relative to the 
area of law being adjudicated. The requirement of Dworkinian coherence also assists in 
constraining the discretion of the judiciary lest the flexibility of the purposive approach leads 
them down the path of judicial legislation. In this respect, the Dworkinian approach helps to 
maintain the judiciary in an interpretative, rather than a legislative role. Dworkin’s emphasis 
on dynamic statutory interpretation was also referred to, and exemplified in the Gilham case 
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analysis, in order to show its practical effectiveness to the purposive model advocated in this 
thesis.  
The model of purposive interpretation, built in this thesis, has the potential to mitigate the 
adverse impact of potential deregulatory labour law measures in a post-Brexit UK. However, 
the pessimistic predictions outlined in this thesis, relating to labour law deregulation in a post-
Brexit UK, may themselves not come to pass. It is hoped that will be the case. Regardless of 
how these political matters progress, this thesis maintains that the purposive approach which 
is advocated is the right approach for UK labour law to take in any event. It has been shown, 
throughout this thesis, to meet the main challenges and principal goals of labour law in a highly 
effective manner. Even if deregulation does not take place, the purposive approach remains the 
most promising way at present to fulfil labour law’s most important goal: the amelioration of 
the power imbalance in the employment relationship and the consequent re-assertion of the 
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